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Executive Summary 
In a rapidly-changing globalised economy, companies need to become more competitive to 
stay ahead of the competition and sustain the advantage of being on the top. Supply chain 
efficiency and lean production are familiar in supply chain management. However, there are 
impediments to the extent of success that companies wish to achieve. One such impediment is 
demand amplification (or the bullwhip effect) through the supply chain. 
This study investigated the impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect, the impact of 
variability in materials and information flow, and the relationship between the impact of 
human behaviour and that of materials and information flow on the bullwhip. The research 
included a case study to validate the findings of the former investigations. 
A questionnaire survey was conducted using a sample of supply chain role-players for the 
investigation of human behaviour of the bullwhip. A separate study was conducted on a 
sample of real-time projects for the investigation of materials and information flow on the 
bullwhip. A comparison was drawn between the two independent studies. A case study was 
presented, based on a power-lines refurbishment project, currently in the construction phase. 
The results on human behaviour revealed that the types of "disabling" behaviour, namely 
"panic" or "safe harbour" exist amongst supply chain role-players. The findings of the study 
on real-time projects showed chronic variability in materials and information flow. Similar 
results have been reported from the findings of the case study. 
The key conclusion is that there is a relationship between people and processes and both have 
an impact on the bullwhip. 
The recommendations made are applicable to a generic company as well as Eskom. An 
action plan for a way forward for Eskom is included in this study. The key elements of the 
action plan include revision of the current policy document with suppliers, prioritization of 
customer projects and optimal use of the warehousing function. 
Further research is proposed to extend the investigation to other regions and divisions within 
Eskom and to probe into the suppliers' supply chain to promote efficiency. 
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Glossary of Terms 
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productive and wasteful. 
VMI Vendor Managed Inventory A supply chain in which the supplier manages the 
inventory. Inventory is delivered directly where 
needed instead of warehousing. 
VSM Value Stream Management Improvement of designs and specifications at research 
and development stage of product development 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Supply Chain Management is certainly one of the familiar "buzz-words" in modern 
production-related industries. While the concept is one of integrating business processes from 
the end-user to original equipment manufacturers, the process is not without glitches. 
Research conducted on variability (later known as the bullwhip effect) within the supply chain 
had been conducted in industries other than the electricity distribution industry, which forms 
the basis for this dissertation. The company focus is on Eskom, which supplies 95% of South 
Africa's electricity. Within this large parastatal, there are three divisions, namely Generation, 
Transmission and Distribution. This dissertation is based on the Distribution division and 
more specifically on the Eastern Region. 
A Regional Performance Compact (RPC) had been devised for the six regions within the 
Eskom Distribution Group with the main objective of creating inter-regional competitiveness 
by means of a set of common KPFs. The variance between forecasted and actual information 
was measured and weighted. The summation of the various measures translates to a 
percentage of bonuses that is awarded to a specific region from the bonus pool as illustrated in 
Table 1.1. The comparative ranking of the Eskom regions is shown at the bottom of the table. 
Of the six regions, the Eastern Region has come in last position. The major contributing 
factors to the poor performance were the variability in the supply chain which has resulted in 
the inability in meeting the needs of customers. Electricity connections to customers were 
under target, that is 18000 connections per household compared to a target of 35 000. This 
has a cascading effect of being under-spent on Capital expenditure targets and not meeting or 
exceeding customer expectations. It is therefore consistent with the poor performance 
illustrated by the Customer Index: the Eastern Region score was 10.42. The target score was 
12.00. The customer connection rating was 4.68 which was below the target score of 7.20. 
The results of 2005 and the interim results of 2006 have followed a similar trend. For clarity 
an extract of the 2006 interim results for stock is included in Table 1.2. 
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A. Bonus Pool; 
1. Revenue 4% 2.40 4.00 4.80 3.74 3.40 4.80 4.80 4.80 
2. Operating Cost 14% 8.40 14.00 16.80 16.80 16.80 16.55 16.80 16.80 
3. Working Capita! 
B. Eskom Modifiers: 
1. Capital Expenditure 
2% 1.20 2.00 2.40 2.01 2.40 2.27 1.20 1.64 
20% 12.00 20.00 24.00 22.55 22.60 23.62 22.80 2374 
6.0% 3.60 6.00 7.20 7.20 5.71 7.20 7.20 4.32 
2. Customer Index 12.0% 7.20 12.00 14.40 13.81 12.02 14.40 12.01 10.42 
3. Electrification Connections (inci FWH) 7.8% 4.68 7.80 9.36 9.36 9.36 9.36 8.55 4.68 
4. Technical - Dips 4.5% 2.70 4.50 5.40 5.40 5.23 5.06 5.40 5.31 
5. Technical - Waveform 6.0% 3.60 6.00 7.20 7.06 6.41 7.20 7.20 7.20 
6. DIIR 4.5% 2.70 4.50 5.40 5.40 5.40 4.05 5.40 5.40 
7. BEE Payments 4.2% 2.52 4.20 5.04 4.33 4.72 4.51 4.70 4.64 
5. BWO Payments 3.0% 1.80 3.00 3.60 3.50 3.07 3.60 3.60 3.60 
8. Gender Equity 4.8% 2.88 4.80 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 4.39 
10. Racial Equity 4.8% 2.88 4.80 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.76 3.49 5.76 
11. Disability Equity 
Eskom Pool & Modifiers 
C. Divisional Modifiers: 
2.4% 1.44 2.40 2.88 2.88 2.86 2.88 2.16 2.72 
60% 36.00 60.00 72.00 70.46 66.30 69.78 65.47 58.45 
80% 48.00 80.00 96.00 93.01 88.89 93.40 8877 81.69 
1. EDI Restructuring 4% 2.40 4.00 4.80 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
2. Forcasting Accuracy 1% 0.60 1.00 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
3. Inter Divisional Service (Other Eskom Groups) 1% 0.60 1.00 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
4. Refurbishment Cost 1% 0.60 1.00 1.20 1.20 0.60 1.20 0.60 0.60 
5. HR Sustainability Index 3% 1.80 3.00 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.16 
6. Operational Sustainability Index 4% 2.40 4.00 4.80 4.52 3.56 4.20 4.52 4.49 
7. Enviromental: 
Legal contraventions affecting SI 
1% 0.60 1.10 1.20 1.20 1.18 0.72 1.18 1.20 




1% 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.42 0.58 0.60 
2% 1.20 2.20 2.40 2.38 1.80 2,24 2.28 276 
1.0% 0.60 1.00 1.20 1.18 0.60 1.04 1.08 1.06 
Significant Findings Overdue 
9. Credit Management: 
LPU >90days (Total) 
1.0% 0.60 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 
1% 0.60 1.00 1.20 1.20 1.18 1.11 0.98 1.09 
0.1% 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
SPU >90days (Live Accounts) 0.4% 0.24 0.40 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.40 0.40 
LPU Days (Total) 0.2% 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.12 0.22 
SPU Days (Live Accounts) 
10. Residential Losses 
TOTAL 
0.3% 0.18 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.36 
2% 1.20 2.00 2.40 2.40 2.40 278 2.01 2.40 
20% 12.00 20.30 24.00 22.49 20.32 21.34 21.17 21.20 
100% 60.00 100.30 120.00 115.50 109.22 114.73 109.44 102.89 
Bonus Pool: Comoarativfi Ran kino: %ofon Taretet Bonus oool: 
1. Western 115.50 104.7 
2. Northern 114.73 104.0 
3. C&NW Combined 109.44 99.2 







From Table 1.2 it can be observed that the Eastern Region has come last for Stock measured 
as a 12 month moving average and has scored half of the points (0.60) of the other regions 
that scored maximum points (1.20). 
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West South North Central 
North 
West East weight Min OT Max 
A. Bonus Pool: 
4. Stock [12mma] 
R'OO 
0 1.0% 0.60 1.00 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.60 
(Eskom, 2006:2) 
In terms of the allocation of the bonus pool, the region that has come in last must donate 20% 
of their allocated pool to the region that has come first. Hence the penalty for being last is 
severe. The employee morale of the Region is affected by these low scores. 
There is a need for improving supply chain efficiency to prevent a recurrence of the above 
performance in future. This dissertation aims at addressing the bottlenecks and proposes a 
way forward so that the company can continue to be competitive as a global player. 
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The research objectives were three-fold as follows: 
1.2.1. Research Objective One 
To determine the impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect. 
1.2.2. Research Objective Two 
To determine the impact of fluctuation in materials and information flow on the bullwhip 
1.2.3. Research Objective Three 
To investigate the relationship between research objectives one and two and validating by 
means of a case study. 
1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (SUMMARY) 
The research methodology used to achieve the first objective was through a questionnaire 
survey. A sample of real-time projects was used for the accomplishment of the second 
objective A comparison was drawn for both findings to achieve objective three and a random 
project currently in the construction phase was chosen for the case study to validate the 
findings. 
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1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is divided into eight chapters. 
Chapter Two: This chapter presents a historical background of key developments regarding 
the bullwhip effect. Examples of the bullwhip effect in various industries are 
illustrated and its causal factors and mitigating measure discussed. 
Chapter Three: This chapter focuses on Eskom's company background, its supply chain, and 
Regional processes. 
Chapter Four : This is the methodology chapter. It focuses on the problem statement, 
objectives of the research and research design. 
Chapter Five: This chapter focuses on the research findings 
Chapter Six: draws conclusion of this research 
Chapter Seven : provides recommendations based on this research 
Chapter Eight: proposes further research and limitations of this research 
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Chapter Two: The Bullwhip Effect 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
According to Donovan (2004:1), the objective of supply chain management is to provide a 
consistent flow of accurate relevant information that will enable suppliers to provide timeous, 
uninterrupted flow of materials to customers. When SCM is well executed, Hugo et al 
(2004:66) are of the view that suppliers, manufacturers, warehouses and intermediaries are 
integrated to the extent that "production and distribution is synchronized with customer 
demand". This in effect reduces system costs and fulfills the needs of service level 
agreements. 
According to Lee et al (1997:93), distorted information flow can lead to variability 
throughout the supply chain. Nienhaus et al (2003:5), Simchi-Levi et al (2000:82) and Hugo 
et al (2004:66) share the view that variability in demand increases as one moves up the 
supply chain. Geary et al (2005:2), refer to the variability in demand as demand 
amplification. This phenomenon is known as the "bullwhip effect" and is described in more 
detail in the next section. 
2.2. THE BULLWHIP EFFECT-TOWARDS A DEFINITION 
2.2.1. Historical Overview 
Jay Forrester (1958:38) is regarded as the pioneer of supply chain management based on his 
studies on demand amplification through System Dynamics simulation. System Dynamics 
deals with how things change through time and can be simulated by computer models. 
Forrester (1958: 47) simulated the propagation of demand waveforms upstream in the supply 
chain and introduced the concept of "rogue seasonality" to show the order patterns of 
promotions and discounts. According to Fisher (1997:107), the concept of the bullwhip is 
not new and dates back to the twentieth century. 
Most studies of the bullwhip effect (also known as the "whiplash" or "whipsaw" effect) 
converge towards the emphasis of variability in demand across the supply chain (Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984:20). According to Holmstrom (1997:108), the amplification of the 
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bullwhip can be as much as 20:1. This may lead to stock-outs and severe losses for the 
industry. Consequently, when demand is reduced, then stock-on-hand and obsolete stock 
increases (Metters, 1997:91). The bullwhip effect is described as a consequence of unplanned 
demand oscillations, which may be a minor blip for one customer but may often result in 
"huge and costly disturbances at the supplier end of the chain"(Donavan, 2004:1). Lee et al 
(1997:93) definition of the bullwhip effect is the amplification of demand variability as a 
result of information distortion in a supply chain where companies upstream do not have 
information on actual consumer demand. According to Burt et al (2003:628), the bullwhip 
effect is a "fictional or phantom demand" and originates from the "failure to accurately 
estimate demand". The cumulative effect of the bullwhip is observed when inaccurate 
information cascades up the supply chain (Burt et al 2003:627). Leenders et al (2002:211) 
describes the bullwhip effect as "a large fluctuation in demand" due to for example, poor 
order policies that are based on lot sizes like full truckloads to minimize shipping costs. A 
more comprehensive definition of the bullwhip effect is that it is a phenomenon that 
"describes how inaccurate information, a lack of transparency throughout the supply chain, 
and a disconnect between production and real-time supply chain information result in lost 
revenue, bad customer service, high inventory levels and unrealized profits" (Factory Logic 
Whitepaper, 2003:2). 
2.2.2 . Supply Chain Efficiency 
Schmenner (2001:87) is of the view that for supply chain management to be effective; there 
must be a swift and even material flow. Burbidge (1981:88) made great strides in efficiency 
in the supply chain by advocating the use of smaller batches to reduce set up times of 
manufacturing lines. Forrester and Burbidge invented the FORJUDGE approach which is a set 
of streamlined material flow principles to reduce the effect of the bullwhip. In an effort to 
improve on the FORJUDGE approach, various theories emerged but converged towards 
supply chain efficiency. The theories were operational research (Lee et al, 1997:101), Control 
Theory (Disney and Towill, 2002:180) and filter theory (Dejonckheere et al, 2002:135). 
These studies provided the basis for imperical studies of the bullwhip using simulation 
(Forrester, 1958:38; van Ackere et a/,1993:413). Other studies included business process re-
engineering, especially in global supply chains. (Towill and McCullen, 1999:84; Miragliotta, 
2004; Watson, 1994:262). 
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2.2.3. Historical Best Practices in the Supply Chain 
The development of smooth material flows was documented in the design and construction of 
the Crystal Palace in London in 1851(Towill et al, 2002:80). The construction led to the 
concept of Just-in Time (Wilkinson, 2000:51). Drucker (1995:56) used Japanese methods of 
value stream management (VSM) which was practiced at General Motors. Lean production 
was practiced at Toyota in 1970's and used to develop metrics for benchmarking (Womack et 
al., 1990:62). The bullwhip effect was historically known, but not defined. Hence there were 
not many solutions available. Mitchell (1923:633), Sterman (1986:88) and Zymelman 
(1965:589) had knowledge of this effect in the textile and cotton industry. Other studies in a 
similar industry were undertaken by Stalk and Hout (1990). In the mid 1990's, Joseph 
Andraski (1994:2), estimated that only 7% of supply chains in the US retail industry are 
effective. 
2.3. EXAMPLES OF THE BULLWHIP EFFECT 
A number of industries such as the beer, diaper, tobacco, printing and soup industry is 
considered in the discussion of the bullwhip effect. 
2.3.1. The Beer Industry 
In Figure 2.3.1, a four-stage beer supply chain may be observed which has a retailer (liquor 
outlet), a wholesaler, a distributor and a manufacturer (brewery). 
Figure 2.3.1. Illustration of the Bullwhip Effect 
Increasing variability in demand 
Increase in inventory or higher capacity maintained 
Manufacturer 
(Brewery) 




(Hugo, Badenhorst-Weiss and Biljon, 2004:67) 
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The retailer obtains demand data from the consumer and based on this demand, the retailer 
places orders to the wholesaler. The wholesaler uses the retailer's demand information and 
places orders with the distributor who in turn places orders with the manufacturer, who in this 
instance is the brewery. 
In order to describe the variability in demand, the second stage of the supply chain, namely 
the wholesaler, is considered. Beer quantities that the wholesaler needs are dependent upon 
the retailer's demand. Assuming that the wholesaler does not have access to the retailer's 
demand information such as weekly beer sales, or that the data is not accurate, and then the 
wholesaler will forecast the retailer's demand based on orders placed by the retailer. These 
orders are variable on a daily or weekly basis. In the interest of customer satisfaction, the 
wholesaler is obliged to carry more safety stock or maintain higher capacity than the retailer. 
The phenomenon of carrying more inventory or maintaining higher capacity increases as one 
moves up the supply chain (Hugo et al, 2004:67). The implications are that an even higher 
inventory level that is higher carrying costs, are incurred by the distributor and manufacturer. 
These inefficiencies may be reduced or eliminated by using various techniques described in 
section 2.7. under " Mitigating the Bullwhip Effect". 
2.3.2. The Diaper Industry 
At Proctor and Gamble, logistics executives discovered that one of their products, "Pampers", 
displayed an interesting phenomenon [Lee et al (1997:93), Simchi-Levi et al (2000:82)]. 
While the retail sales of the product were fairly uniform, it was observed that the distributor's 
orders placed to the manufacturer fluctuated much more than retail sales. This is similar to the 
beer industry described earlier in the text. According to Lee et al (1997:93), one would 
expect that babies consumed diapers at a constant rate but the variability in the supply chain 
amplified as one moved up the supply chain; a typical display of the bullwhip effect. 
2.3.3. The Tobacco Industry 
The example of how the behaviour of a sales representative of a tobacco company in 
Richmond, Virginia influenced the bullwhip effect in the industry is cited in Burt et al 
(2003:628). The sales representative would frequently enquire about the stock levels of the 
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retailers. The retailers believed that there was an increased demand for the product and in 
turn increased orders from the manufacturer. The manufacturer reacted to the retail demand 
by hiring additional resources, adding a new shift and paying overtime. The tobacco suppliers 
increased agricultural operations and hired more workers. 
However at retail level, sales were slow and declining due to increased stock levels and anti-
smoking lobby-groups. The retailers then cancelled future orders from the manufacturer. The 
manufacturer reacted by eliminating shift work and retrenched newly hired workers. The 
suppliers' orders were subsequently reduced and newly hired resources on farmlands were 
cancelled. 
2.3.4. The Printing Industry 
The sales of one of Hewlett-Packard (HP) best-selling printers, were examined by the 
company's executives due to fluctuations in orders at the retailers ( Lee et al ,1997:93). It has 
since been observed that the orders placed by the retailer to the factory had even greater 
swings. The fluctuation in orders increased from the printer division to the integrated circuit 
division. 
The company attributed the inefficiency of its supply chain to the bullwhip effect, where 
distorted information was transmitted up the chain by retailers exaggerating sales figures. 
One of the main reasons for the fluctuations, according to Lee et al (1997:93), is poor product 
forecasting . Each level in the supply chain depended on demand data from the previous 
level. The consequences were crippling, for instance, poor customer service prevailed due to 
stock-outs and high corrective costs such as expedited shipping and overtime costs negatively 
influenced the company's bottom-line profitability. 
2.3.5. The Soup Industry 
The soup industry is an example of seasonal sales fluctuation with higher winter sales as 
shown in Figure 2.3.5. Companies in this industry have to often run overtime for a short 
period and stay idle at other periods due to these fluctuations in demand (Lee et al, 2004:97). 
Another strategy that companies implement is to stock-pile in anticipation of future demand. 
This type of practice may lead to damage of inventory in transit due to the handling of large 
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volumes. Furthermore, the cost of shipment increases due to the payment of premium rates 
for transporting the product. 













(Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang, 1997:97) 
2.4. COMPARISON OF THE BULLWHIP EFFECT IN VARIOUS INDUSTRIES 
The bullwhip effect has a common pattern of occurrence through many industries described 
earlier in the text. 
Figure 2.4. Increasing variability of orders up the supply chain 
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It may be illustrated in a typical consumer product where consumer sales vary marginally, but 
the variability in orders is greater from retailer to wholesaler and in turn from wholesaler to 
manufacturer and so on. 
For instance, in the computer and pharmaceutical industry, information distortions may cause 
inventory on hand to exceed 100 days (Lee et al, 1997:94). When the shelf life of these 
products is considered to be around a few days to about three months, the decision to stock up 
is an extremely costly one. 
2.5. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR ON THE BULLWHIP EFFECT AND 
SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE 
2.5.1. Beer game simulation 
Studies reported by Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the beer distribution game played online, with 
more than 400 participants, show how humans perform as co-makers in the supply chain as 
compared to simple agency-based strategies such as "moving average" or "keep level of 
stock". The simulation is based on a four-stage supply chain similar to that illustrated in 
Figure 2.3.1. Orders flow from the customer to the retailers and up the chain while the 
material flows from the manufacturer downwards to the customer. Decisions are executed by 
co-makers based on current stock levels, the time to transport stocks and time to order stock 
from suppliers with lead times of one period between each stage in the supply chain. The 
goal of the exercise was to minimize the overall cost of the supply chain by finding the 
balance between minimizing the cost of capital employed in stocks and avoiding stock out 
situations. 
According to Nienhaus et al (2003:5), the optimum solution is when the co-maker passes onto 
the supplier the customer's order after refilling customer stock levels. In this way the initial 
stock levels would be sufficient to cover an unexpected higher demand during information 
and material lead times. For example, if at each stage in the supply chain, it takes one period 
of time to inform suppliers of a change in demand and two periods to replenish customer 
stock from the supplier, then the reaction time to the change in demand is a total of three 
periods. Suppose unexpected demand is four units, then the stock required to meet this 
change in demand is twelve units, that is, the unexpected usage multiplied by the total lead 
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time. At period one the stock level will be eight (12-4), period two will be four (8-4) and 
period zero (4-4). The supply chain is then adjusted to the new order filling which, in this 
instance, is eight instead of four units. 
2.5.2. Human Strategies 
Figure 2.5.2. illustrates the types of human strategies namely "safe harbour" or "panic". Dots 
depict the typical action of a co-maker .On the horizontal axis is the cost of capital employed 
and the vertical axis is the penalty for out-of stock situations. The further along the horizontal 
a co-maker is, the higher will be the cost of capital employed. The further up the vertical axis 
a co-maker is located, the greater the penalty for out of stock. According to the simulation, 
the best solution for humans was according to the "keep level of stock" strategy resulting in a 
total cost of 228 for four co-makers combined. For the computer, the best solution was no 
costs for out-of stock situations. It was reported that the average total costs for humans was 
about 800-900 units with an extreme case of 4000 unit costs incurred by the worst-
performing group. 
Figure 2.5.2. Performance of human co-makers vs. agent-based strategies 
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2.5.3. Reasons for poor performance by human co-makers 
According to Nienhaus et al (2003:5), human co-makers act as "safe harbours" in the supply 
chain. This implies that this group of co-makers order more than is required thereby 
increasing safety stock. The supplier reacts by increasing his orders and pay for out-of-stock 
situations. Only one co-maker displaying the "safe-harbour" strategy can negatively impact 
on the entire supply chain. 
The other extremity in strategy is "panic". Typical reaction of co-makers in this category is to 
get rid of stock before demand increases by the end customer. When there is an increase in 
demand from the end customer, the co-maker orders more than one who has safety stock left. 
The outcome of employing a "panic" strategy is the same as that of the "safe harbour" 
strategy; both have the same negative impact on the supply chain. 
The conclusions from the simulations were that the greater the deviation from the best 
solution as shown in Figure 2.5.2, the higher will be the cost incurred due to the tendency to 
adopt either the "panic" or "safe harbour" strategy. 
2.5.4. Changing supply chain process versus changing role-players behaviour 
Lee et al (1997:95) argue that companies wanting to control the bullwhip effect should focus 
on "modifying the chain's infrastructure and related processes rather than the decision 
makers' behaviour." Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the other hand, demonstrates that human 
behaviour does influence the efficiency of a supply chain. The reasons put forward on the 
impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect are in addition to other reasons influencing 
this phenomenon.(Niehaus et al ,2003:8). 
According to Matta and Ashkenas (2003:111), the key to the completion of successful 
projects is to set up results-orientated integrated teams. An example cited in the text is the 
increase in milk production in Nicaragua from 600 gallons to 1600 gallons in 120 days. 
Parmalat, the largest milk producer in Nicaragua, set up a milk productivity team to meet the 
aforementioned objective. The team discovered that more than half of all milk purchased by 
distributors was being dumped due to contamination and spoilage. The solution was to test 
the milk at source using a centrifuge that would expedite testing. Furthermore, to limit 
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fluctuation in demand, the milk was collected daily rather than twice weekly. This solution 
has also reduced operating costs by not investing in expensive refrigeration equipment. 
The team leader assigned to the milk production project had discovered that role-players 
preferred to work on projects that are results-orientated , despite the risks involved in such 
projects, rather than opt for implementing a set of predefined tasks without risks (Matta and 
Ashkenas, 2003:112). 
2.6. CAUSAL FACTORS OF THE BULLWHIP EFFECT AND ITS 
IMPACT ON SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE 
Much has been discussed on the human behavioural impact on the bullwhip in the previous 
section. The bullwhip effect has been illustrated in section 2.3 by way of examples. However, 
there are other factors that contribute to this phenomenon and hence the need for further 
discussions on the subject at hand. 
2.6.1. Lead time of information and materials 
Lead time of information and material lead times is reported to be one of the primary reasons 
for the bullwhip effect ( Niehaus et al ,2003:5). The supply chain in Figure 2.6.1. illustrates 
the components of total lead time in a supply chain. 
Figure 2.6.1. A simple supply chain showing lead time elements 
Order lead time 
Order lead time 
Order lead time 







Delivery lead time 
Delivery lead time 
Delivery lead time 
(Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 2000:83) 
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According to Hugo et al, (2004:156), each stage of the supply chain as illustrated in Figure 
2.6.1., must establish demand from its customers. For instance, the wholesaler accepts orders 
from the retailer and places orders with the distributor. To expedite delivery of an order, the 
wholesaler forecasts order quantities received from the retailer and other retailers in the 
supply chain. The only source of information that the wholesaler has at his or her disposal, is 
the order quantity placed by the retailer and not the external demand data from the retailer's 
customers. The wholesaler would then add safety stock to the orders placed to the distributor. 
However, this practice of adding safety stock is repeated for the other retailers. The 
wholesaler may batch all retailer orders as a single order to the distributor and consequently 
amplify the demand, as there is an element of safety stock in each of the retailers' orders. 
The amplified demand, or bullwhip effect, increases with an increase in lead times as more 
provision is made for safety stock. It is thus important for inventory planners to monitor the 
accuracy of lead times and safety stock and make every effort in reducing these elements 
(Ross, D.F., 1996:303). 
According to Niehaus et al ,(2003:2), the value of information is often under-estimated. 
Research conducted among operational managers from 200 companies has shown that the 
more important the information from customers is, the more frequently it is available to the 
company. However, it was discovered that operational managers would pass on the same 
information less frequently to their suppliers. By not passing on customer information to 
suppliers when it is available, the operational manager then becomes a hindrance to the flow 
of information throughout the supply chain, causing the bullwhip effect to be amplified by the 
increase in information lead times. 
2.6.2. Centralized versus Decentralized Information 
Irrespective of whether the supply chain is centralized or decentralized, the variance in order 
quantities increases when one moves up the supply chain. The difference between the two 
types of supply chains is the extent of variability as one moves from one stage to the next. 
In a decentralized supply chain, customer demand is known only to the retailer, whereas in a 
centralized supply chain customer demand data is available at each stage of the supply chain 
(Simchi-Levi et al, 2000:90). 
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According to Chen et al, (2000:437), efforts to quantify the bullwhip effect has led to two 
mathematical inequality models which quantify the impact of lead time on the bullwhip 
effect. The application of the model has shown that variance in orders increase additively in 
total lead time of a centralized supply chain. However, the variance in orders increases 
multiplicatively in a decentralized supply chain. 
The conclusion derived by Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:90), is that by centralizing demand data, 
the bullwhip effect can be significantly reduced. The differences between the two systems are 
illustrated in Figure 2.6.2, where "C" and "D" refer to centralized and decentralized supply 
chains in a particular stage "k" for lead time of 1 week between each stage. 
Figure 2.6.2. Increase in variability for centralized and decentralized systems 
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2.6.3. Demand forecast updating 
According to Geary et al (2005:10) forecasts are rarely accurate. However in-built safety 
factors and trend detection makes forecasting more accurate. Lee et al (1997:93) are of the 
view that forecasting is based more frequently on historic order data from the company's 
immediate customers. When downstream role-players place an order, upstream managers 
process the information as a signal about future demand for a particular product. The 
upstream manager's reaction is to modify the demand forecast based on the signal received 
from downstream role-players and pass it onto upstream suppliers. 
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According to Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:85), managers use forecast smoothing techniques to 
forecast demand. For example, using exponential smoothing, future demand data is updated 
continuously when daily demand data become available. Orders sent to suppliers will have 
an element of replenishment stock and safety stock levels required. 
As discussed in section 2.6.1, the fluctuation in order quantity is due to the level of safety 
stock and the lead times. For instance, long lead time material orders may have weeks of 
safety stock. This in effect increases the variability in order quantity compared to the demand 
data (Lee et al 1997:95). 
The choice of forecasting systems, according to Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:99), may vary from 
one stage of the supply chain to another. As different techniques are employed by different 
role-players in the supply chain, the integrity of demand data may not be as accurate for 
effective forecasting of future demand. For example, future customer demand is dependent 
on variables such as pricing, promotions and launch of new products. Some of these variables 
are within the control of the retailer, while others are within the control of the wholesaler or 
distributor. For instance, suppose the retailer decides to introduce the launch of new products 
to customers and/or have a price promotion. This would change the demand patterns up the 
supply chain. 
However, suppose all role-players in the supply chain collaborated with the retailer, for 
example the wholesaler and distributor offered more information of the product (as they have 
few products to consider) to the retailer, the retailer would then be in a position to take 
advantage of the situation by increasing inventories or increase the price of the product. This 
demand pattern is then shared with all role-players in the supply chain with a common 
forecasting technique. 
2.6.4. Batch Ordering 
As inventory demand increases in the supply chain, orders are not placed timeously with 
upstream suppliers. The common practice that a company may follow is to batch the demand 
before placing orders. This practice, according to Lee et al (1997:96), may be in the form of 
periodic ordering or push ordering. 
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Companies usually order weekly, biweekly or monthly. According to Simchi-Levi et al, 
(2000:85), if a retailer orders in batches from a wholesaler using a usual min-max inventory 
policy, then the wholesaler observes erratic streams of orders such as large orders followed by 
periods of no orders, large orders again and the pattern may repeat itself. This time-phased 
aggregation of orders leads to the bullwhip (Geary et al, 2005:10). Saunders, M.(l 997:210), is 
of the view that lead times are an integral component of order batching. The effort spent on 
waiting to fill large batches, is inefficient as it ties up capacity to produce goods that are not 
needed immediately. According to Saunders, M.(l997:210), the longer the lead times, the 
greater the capacity and time period held up in stock. 
Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:85) offers reasons as to why companies may order in batches. The 
first reason is that companies incur high costs in filling orders. Proctor and Gamble is one of 
the examples cited by Lee et al (1997:96), of the cost to process an order to its customers: 
between $35 to $75 . The company places orders with its suppliers when they run their MRP 
system, which is normally run monthly. The supplier may be subject to variability in demand 
greater than the company itself. According to Lee et al (1997:96), periodic ordering does 
amplify variability and contributes to the bullwhip effect. The second reason why companies 
batch orders is to save on transportation costs. Lee et al (1997:97) suggests that there are 
incentives in ordering full truckloads as compared to less than a full truckload of materials. 
However, the lead times and order cycles increase as Saunders, M.(1997:210), has highlighted 
earlier in the text. According to Saunders, M.(1997:211), by batching large orders, the need 
for more storage facilities will arise, hence increase in "wasteful costs". 
When quarterly or yearly sales quotas need to be met, salespersons may "borrow" ahead or 
sign orders in advance. This causes the company to experience surges in demand, due to 
orders being "pushed" by salespersons wanting to meet incentive-driven sales targets. This 
phenomenon is what Lee et al (1997:97) refers to as push ordering. 
The ideal scenario would be one in which all customers' order cycles are evenly spread in a 
given period. However, as Lee et al (1997:97) points out that orders may be randomly spread 
or overlap with customers ordering periodically. The problem arises when random orders and 
periodic orders coincide. This surge in demand is most pronounced and influences variability 
from the bullwhip effect the most. 
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According to Lee et al (1997:97), companies that generate purchase orders either at the 
beginning or end of the month, are subjected to order cycle overlapping. Hence, the periodic 
running of MRP systems contributes to the bullwhip effect. 
Shapiro et al (2004:164), are of the view that companies should staple themselves to orders; 
implying that if customer orders are handled quickly, accurately and effectively, then the 
variability and hence the bullwhip effect is reduced. 
2.6.5. Price Fluctuation 
Research has shown , according to Lee et al (1997:97), that 80 percent of transactions 
concluded during the manufacturer and distributor stage of the supply chain, were items 
purchased in a "forward buying" way. This implies that the distributors made use of 
manufacturers' discount structure. Promotions in the form of price discounts, quantity 
discounts, coupons and rebates are carried out periodically by manufacturers and distributors. 
Lee et al (1997:97) reports that all forms of promotions result in price fluctuation. 
Manufacturers may also offer other incentives to distributors and wholesalers in the form of 
special pricing and payment terms, which are indirectly, price discounts. The outcome of this 
practice is that customers purchase in quantities that are not reflective of their immediate 
needs. Customers will purchase in large quantities and stock up for future demand. This 
phenomenon was demonstrated by Fisher (1997:105-109). 
When the price is low through discounts or promotions, Lee et al (1997:97) suggests that 
customers engage in forward buying, that is buying more than what is needed. When the 
purchase price returns to normal, the customer will not purchase until inventory in hand is 
depleted. As the buying pattern does not correlate with the consumption pattern, the variation 
due to purchasing is higher than the variation in consumption. This is indicative of the 
bullwhip effect. 
A company's decision to implement forward buying may only be viable if the holding cost of 
inventory is less than the price differential, that is the difference between the normal and 
discounted price. A high-low buying practice does not work well in some industries such as 
the soup industry as illustrated in Figure 2.3.5 in section 2.3.5. As seasonal sales are higher in 
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winter, factories may run overtime on some occasions and remain idle during other times. 
Some companies may opt to stockpile to meet anticipated demand. The costs associated with 
storage and handling of high volume inventory may be substantial. Lee et al (1997:97) are of 
the view that companies may have to pay premium-shipping rates for large volume inventory. 
Furthermore, damage of inventory may occur from the handling of abnormal volumes of 
inventory. Lee et al (1997:97) reports that trade promotions may have a negative impact on 
the stock performance of manufacturers. The example cited by Lee et al (1997:97), is the 
Bristol-Myers Squibb incident where shares dropped from $74 per share to $67 per share 
during a quarterly assessment. The sales volumes dropped from an expected 13% to an actual 
5%. The poor performance was attributed to previous quarter sales promotions that saturated 
the company's distribution channel with forward buying of the company's products. 
2.6.6. Rationing and Shortage Gaming 
According to Lee et al (1997:97) rationing occurs when demand exceeds supply. For 
instance, a manufacturer may ration its products to its customers by a proportion of their total 
order. For example if the manufacturer rations the total supply to be 50% of total demand, 
then all customer orders will be filled by 50% of their demand. According to Mitchell 
(1923:632), orders are placed to "hedge" against unpredictable supply. 
Customer reaction to rationing may lead to inflated orders to the manufacturer, in view of the 
anticipated short supply. However, when the demand reduces, customers may cancel orders, 
hence "game" the rationing. Lee et al (1997:97) are of the view that customer orders in this 
instance, give scarce data to the supplier. An example cited by Lee et al (1997:98), is the 
perceived shortage of computer chips. Customers placed duplicate orders with multiple 
suppliers and purchased only from the supplier that delivered the product first. The other 
orders were subsequently cancelled. 
Ottesen and Gronhaug (2002:216) report that for example, in the fishing industry, when raw 
materials are scarce, companies build a buffer zone of stock. Companies may use incentives 
to fishing vessels to meet targets of buffer stocks and consequently reduce fluctuation in 
demand for seafood products. 
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2.6.7. Supplier Selection and Evaluation 
The choice of suppliers is critical to the success of the supply chain. According to Burt et al 
(2003:332), potential suppliers must be evaluated individually based on their capability in 
terms of capacity to deliver products on time according to the right quality and quantity. The 
ability to be flexible is also taken into consideration in the evaluation process. 
2.6.8. Strategic Partnerships and Supplier Integration 
Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:91) is of the view that lack of strategic partnerships and supplier 
integration is a major cause of the bullwhip effect. 
According to Wagner (2003:: 11), there is a high degree of supplier integration within the 
electrical and electronic industry but a low degree of supplier integration in the pulp and paper 
and oil refining industry in both the manufacturing and new product development phase. This 
conclusion was derived from an analysis of responses from 173 companies. The benefits of 
supplier integration are improved logistics, lower costs and lower stock levels for the 
manufacturing companies. From a customer perspective, suppliers achieving reliability in 
delivery times and order filling, providing spare parts and frequent information updates will 
reach a higher level of customer satisfaction. 
2.7. MITIGATING THE BULLWHIP EFFECT 
Lee et al (1997:99) are of the view that managers can reduce the effect of the bullwhip by 
developing strategies to counteract the causes of the phenomenon as shown in Table 2.7. 
According to Lee et al (1997:99), the interventions required to mitigate the bullwhip may fall 
within the ambit of three broad categories namely, information sharing, channel alignment or 
operational efficiency which is part of the framework for supply chain co-ordination 
initiatives in reducing the bullwhip effect as depicted in Table 2.7. 
A discussion of the framework is necessary to explain the mitigating measures to be 
undertaken. However there are other mitigating measures to consider in view of the 
additional causal factors identified in the previous section. 
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Table 2.7. Framework for Supply Chain Coordination Initiatives 
Causes of the Bullwhip Information Sharing Channel Alignment Operational Efficiency 
Demand Forecast • Understanding • Vender-managed • Lead-time 
Update system dynamics inventory (VMI) reduction 
• Use of point-of- • Discount for • Echelon-based 
sale (POS) data information inventory control 







• Consumer direct 
Batch Ordering • EDI • Discount for • Reduction in 
• Internet truck-load fixed cost of 
Ordering assortment ordering by EDI 






Price Fluctuation • Continuous • Everyday low 
replenishment price (EDLP) 
program (CRP) • Activity-based 
• Everyday low 
costs (EDLC) 
costing (ABC) 
Shortage Gaming • Sharing sales • Allocation based 
capacity and 
inventory data 
on past sales 
(Lee, Padmanabhan,Whang, 1997:99) 
2.7.1. Reducing lead times 
According to Simchi-Levi et al (2000:92), lead times magnify the increase in variability due 
to forecasting. The effects of lead times have been demonstrated in section 2.5.1. in the "beer 
simulation game" and section 2.6.1. on "lead times of information and materials". It is 
therefore noted by Simchi-Levi et al (2000:92), that reduction of lead times reduces the 
bullwhip effect in the supply chain. 
By advocating the reduction of order lead-times and information lead-times, Simchi-Levi et al 
(2000:91) is of the view that the bullwhip effect can be reduced. The solution offered by 
Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:91) is two-fold; firstly to promote cross docking to reduce order lead 
times and secondly to use EDI to reduce information lead times. 
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2.7.2. Sharing Information through a Centralized Supply Chain 
According to Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:90), in a centralized supply chain; actual customer 
demand data is used at each stage to forecast average demand. However in a decentralized 
system, each stage uses orders placed from the previous stage to forecast average demand, as 
demand information is not shared. Forecasts obtained in this way are more variable than 
actual customer demand information, hence more variability in orders placed. 
Truong and Azadivar (2005:469) have conducted numerous simulations of information flow 
in supply chains and the simulation confirms that the bullwhip effect is damped by centralized 
information sharing. 
2.7.2. Prevention of Multiple Demand Forecast Updates 
The bullwhip effect is amplified when each stage of the supply chain forecasts demand based 
on data obtained from the immediate downstream stage. The solution to the problem, 
according to Lee et al (1997:99), is to make the data from the downstream stage available to 
the upstream stage. In this way, both stages will make use of the same data to update their 
forecasts. Centralized demand information reduces uncertainty throughout the supply chain 
(Simchi-Levi et al, 2000:91). 
An example cited by Lee et al (1997:99) is that of computer manufacturers such as IBM, HP 
and Apple who mandate their distributors for point -of-sale (POS) data in order to update the 
manufacturer's forecast accurately. The sell-through data requested by the computer 
manufacturers form part of the contract with distributors and retailers. 
Dobler and Burt, (1996:103) are of the view that companies operating an electronic data 
interchange (EDI) system will eliminate the need for generating hard copies of purchase 
orders, shipping notices, invoices between organizations. By using EDI, both buyer and 
supplier are operating in a real-time environment, hence material delays are reduced or 
eliminated and procurement lead-times are shortened. Lee et al (1997:99) highlights the 
growing trend that companies are adopting towards EDI; in 1992 only 20% of orders placed 
by retailers were transmitted by EDI. In 1995, this figure rose to about 60%, which has 
facilitated data sharing amongst supply chain role-players. 
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Another innovation in ensuring accurate timely forecasts is through vendor-managed 
inventory (VMI) or continuous replenishment program (CRP). In this practice, the upstream 
stage may control re-supply from upstream to downstream. The upstream stage accesses 
information with regards to inventory and demand from the downstream stage and updates the 
required forecasts and re-supply for the downstream stage. Lee et al (1997:99) refers to the 
downstream stage as being a "passive partner" in the supply chain. Some of the companies 
cited by Lee et al (1997:99) that practice CRP are Campbell Soup, Nestle, Nabisco and P&G. 
Inventory reductions of up to 25 percent have been reported by the VMI or CRP alliance. 
P&G makes use of VMI in the diaper supply chain beginning with its supplier, 3M and 
ending with its customer, Wal-Mart. Other examples of such alliances include HP, Motorola 
and Apple (Lee et al, 1997:99). 
According to Lee et al (1997:99), research has shown that multi-echelon inventory systems 
can operate efficiently if downstream information is timeously available upstream. A strategy 
to ensure that this type of inventory system works, is to ensure that control of total inventory 
at upstream as well as downstream stages of the supply chain is optimized. 
Another strategy that companies may adopt is to bypass the downstream stage of the supply 
chain and supply directly to the consumer. Examples of such "consumer direct" programs are 
being used by companies like Dell and Apple Computers who supply the consumer without 
going through the distribution channels (Lee et al, 1997:99). 
As has been described previously in the text, re-supply lead times amplify the bullwhip effect. 
According to Lee et al (1997:99), reduction in variability in demand is achievable through 
operational efficiency, by for example using a just-in-time stock replenishment strategy. 
2.7.4. Reducing order batches 
As described earlier in the text in the section on causal factors of the bullwhip, companies 
need to reduce the batch size and increase the frequency of re-supply. According to Lee et al 
(1997:100), one of the reasons for increasing batch size is the high costs of generating orders 
for placing and replenishing inventory. One of the solutions offered by Lee et al (1997:99), is 
to use EDI. For example, companies like Nabisco perform paperless, computer-assisted 
orders (CAO) and customer orders more frequently. Transactional costs are reduced 
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substantially, for instance, at General Electric, by using EDI, purchase order costs reduced 
from $50 to $5. 
The high cost of transportation of materials was cited previously as being another reason for 
the large order batches. As the difference between full and less-than-full truckloads are 
substantial, most companies will opt for the more economical, full-truckload to order 
materials. On occasions, the truckload may contain a variety of different products from the 
same manufacturer. According to Lee et al (1997:100), the order frequency of such products 
is higher, while the frequency of deliveries to distributors remains unchanged. P&G offers 
discounts to distributors who accept a variety of the company's products. One solution is for 
manufacturers to prepare and ship the variety of products in such a way that the products are 
ready to deliver to the stores (Lee et al, 1997:100). 
Another solution offered by Lee et al (1997:101), is to use third party logistics companies. 
These companies achieve economies of scale by supplying materials from multiple suppliers. 
In this way companies can incur reduced transportation costs due to full-truckloads. Lee et al 
(1997:101), points out that the savings achieved from consolidating orders or multiple pick-
ups far outweighs the additional handling and administration costs associated with such 
operations. In some instances, third party logistics companies may supply truckloads of 
materials to customers who are competitors, such as neighbouring supermarket chains. Small 
volume customers will benefit from this strategy, as discounted transportation costs will be 
passed onto them. 
The reduction of the bullwhip due to order batching is achieved when customers spread their 
periodic orders evenly over time (Lee et al, 1997:101). Manufacturers like P&G co-ordinate 
re-supply with their customers through regular delivery appointments. By these efforts, P&G 
is able to evenly spread replenishment stocks to retailers. 
2.7.5. Stabilizing Prices 
One of the ways of reducing the bullwhip effect caused by forward buying is to reduce both 
the frequency and level of wholesale price discounting (Lee et al, 1997:101). A solution 
proposed by Lee et al (1997:101), is to reduce incentives for retailers by adopting a uniform 
wholesale pricing policy. For instance, large manufacturers in the grocery industry like 
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Pillsbury, P&G and Kraft, have moved to an "everyday low price" (EDLP) as part of their 
pricing strategy. On a similar note, Lee et al (1997:101) are of the view that retailers and 
distributors can negotiate with their suppliers to take advantage of "everyday low 
cost"(EDLC). 
A further solution offered by Lee et al (1997:101) to stabilize prices, is the use of CRP 
systems in conjunction with a "rationalized wholesale pricing policy" to control retailers' 
employing tactics such as diversion. The use of CAO by manufacturers also reduces the risk 
of undesired practice by retailers. 
Another solution proposed by Lee et al (1997:101) is to promote EDLP by the use of activity-
based costing (ABC) systems. Such a system provides a trigger for companies to detect 
excessive costs associated with forward buying and diversions. Companies that buy in bulk 
and divert their products to other regions do not quantify the total cost of consumption as they 
make use of conventional accounting systems. An ABC system will expose the costs of 
inventory, storage, premium transportation and special handling that were previously hidden. 
According to Lee et al (1997:101), these costs may outweigh the benefit of promotions. 
2.7.6. Prevention of Gaming in shortage situations 
Lee et al (1997:101) are of the view that suppliers allocate products in proportion with past 
sales records and not according to orders placed, during a product shortage situation. Some of 
the major companies that implement this strategy include General Motors, Texas Instruments 
and Hewlett-Packard. 
According to Lee et al (1997:101), in the gaming during shortages, customers have no 
incentives to over-order. As manufacturers disseminate little information to their customers, 
customers have no choice but to accept the supply terms of the manufacturer. The solution 
according to Lee et al (1997:101) is one of co-operation between the manufacturer and its 
customers. Manufacturers may proactively inform customers to place orders in advance of 
their peak sales period to reduce spikes in demand. 
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Another solution offered by Lee et al (1997:101), is to place penalties on retailers in returning 
products to manufacturers. The return policies without penalties encourage retailers to 
exaggerate orders to manufacturers and consequently aggravate the bullwhip effect. 
2.7.7. Good Supplier Selection and Evaluation Processes 
A distinction in low value and high value purchasing is made by Burt et al (2003:332); in low 
value purchases, the evaluation is not as stringent as in high value purchasing. For purchases 
of low value, the evaluation is made by looking at information from websites, or mail. For 
high value purchases, the procedures may involve conducting supplier surveys, conducting 
financial analyses, carrying out site visits to plants, conducting quality, capacity and service 
checking. 
The evaluation process may be based on a set of selection criteria and corresponding rating 
based on its weighting. According to Burt et al (2003:336), an assessment is based on the 
numerical ratings as well as site investigations. As Preis (2003:36) points out, that the 
evaluation process and rating system must be objective by choosing criteria such as price, 
performance and quality rather than just interpersonal satisfaction to ensure an effective 
evaluation. 
Suppliers are selected from those that passed the evaluation process. Sourcing criteria by 
bidding or negotiation or both provides a basis for choosing the successful supplier. The 
importance of a good supplier is highlighted in the next section on strategic partnerships and 
supplier integration. 
2.7.8. Formation of Strategic Partnerships and Supplier Integration 
According to Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:91), the bullwhip effect can be eliminated through the 
constructive use of strategic partnerships. For example, in VMI as described in section 2.7.1, 
the manufacturer does not rely on the retailer's orders and consequently eliminates the 
bullwhip effect as the management of the inventory at the retailer's outlet, is the responsibility 
of the manufacturer. 
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As has been discussed earlier in section 2.6.2 , centralized demand information reduces the 
variability and hence the bullwhip effect as experienced by the upstream stages of the supply 
chain. As Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:93) points out, by encouraging retailers to make their real-
time data available to the supply chain, the upstream stage derives tangible benefits through 
reduction in variability. 
2.8. CONCLUSION 
The bullwhip effect is an aged concept that has been investigated as early as the mid 1950's 
(Forrester, 1958:38). There are numerous causal factors identified in this chapter with 
different arguments presented in mitigating the effect. 
The argument put forward by Lee et al (1997:95) that companies wanting to control the 
bullwhip effect should focus on "modifying the chain's infrastructure and related processes 
rather than the decision makers' behaviour" contradicted that of Nienhaus et al (2003:7) 
where it was demonstrated that human behaviour does influence the efficiency of a supply 
chain. These two arguments are pivotal in the discussion of findings from independent 
studies relating to human behaviour and supply chain processes presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The next chapter has a company focus, namely the Eskom supply chain and processes which 
forms the basis for discussion of the arguments presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter Three: Eskom's Supply Chain 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Eskom is the only company that produces more than 90% of South Africa's electricity and is 
in existence for the past 83 years (Eskom, 2004b:5). An overview of the company's history is 
highlighted under the section below. The Eskom Supply Chain, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. is 
explained under the relevant sequential stages of the supply chain. 
3.2. COMPANY BACKGROUND 
According to Eskom (2004b: 1), after the discovery of gold in 1886, there was a demand for 
electricity supply for mining operations. Small power utilities emerged to supply electricity 
to mining houses. In 1899, the first powerstation was built in Germiston by the General 
Electric Company. In 1906, businessmen, engineers and other stakeholders formed the 
Victoria Falls Power Company. However, through legislation in 1923, the Electricity Supply 
Commission (Escom) was established and became the sole supplier of electricity. In 1929, the 
Sabie River Gorge hydro station became the first station to be designed and commissioned by 
Eskom engineers. Activities in Kwazulu Natal commenced in 1927 with the construction of 
the Colenso power station which was commissioned in 1929. The power-station at Congella 
was built in 1951 mainly to serve the South African Railways and Harbours (Eskom, 
2004b:3). 
The national control centre for electricity was established in the 1960's at Simmerpan, 
Johannesburg, which today controls Eskom's entire transmission network. The control centre 
for the distribution network is located at Mkondeni, Pietermaritzburg. The company supplies 
90% of South Africa's electricity through the efficient use of hydroelectric schemes and 
pulverised coal-fired and nuclear power stations (Eskom, 2004b:5). 
Eskom's core business is split into three entities; Generation, Transmission and Distribution. 
Each entity has an executive director who reports to Eskom's Chief Executive Director 
(CEO), Mr Thulani Gcabashe (Eskom, 2004a:3). 
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Eskom has received an award "in recognition of the company's success in providing the 
world's lowest cost electricity while at the same time making superior technological 
innovations, increasing transmission systems reliability and developing economical, efficient 
and safe methods for combustion of low grade coal." (Eskom , 2004a:2). 
3.3. ESKOM'S SUPPLY CHAIN 
Eskom's supply chain as illustrated in Figure 3.3. begins at the power-station, with coal as the 
primary source for electricity generation. The electricity is transmitted through a network of 
powerlines and interconnected substations. The function of substations is to step down the 
electricity to the voltage required by the customer. 
The process of acquiring the various inputs or materials for the construction of electrical 
infrastructure follows both global and local sourcing strategies. For example, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.3, bauxite, the raw material for the production of aluminum hardware for powerlines, 
is sourced from Australia, while the insulators for the powerline is sourced from France. 
Transformer hardware components are sourced from Brazil and the assembly is done locally 
by ABB. 
The demand for electricity is driven by customer needs. These needs differ from one 
customer to the next; for example if a customer requires a firm uninterrupted quality of 
supply, then the customer is billed at a premium rate compared to a customer who can tolerate 
an occasional outage (Eskom, 2005:5-16). 
3.4. THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION DIVISION SUPPLY CHAIN 
In the Eastern Region, the supply chain begins with the customer. The customer makes an 
application for the supply of electricity through the Eskom Customer Executive. The customer 
application is the trigger for the various "forms" to be generated. Each "form" represents the 
the stages a project is at. For example Form 10 represents the feasibility stage or planning 
phase of the project, Form 15, the detailed stage , Form 150 the pre-construction stage of the 
project and F101 the completion of the project (Eskom, 2005:10). An overview of each stage 
is explained in the discussions that follow. 
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3.4.1. The Form 10 (feasibility) stage 
According to Eskom (2005:12), the time frame mandated to produce a feasibility quote is 30 
days. At this stage the electrical network planners determine whether there is sufficient 
capacity on the network to supply the customer. If the capacity is adequate for a period of 15 
to 20 years, then the customer will be connected from the existing grid from overhead 
powerlines. However, should the capacity be inadequate, then a network consisting of a 
substation and powerline may be necessary to meet customer demand. 
Once the type of infrastructure is determined, the planner will conduct a site visit and prepare 
the Form 10. The planner or design engineer is tasked to compile the feasibility quote, which 
is forwarded to the customer through the customer executive. The feasibility quote is valid 
for a period of 60 days. 
There is no capital recovery for quoting at Form 10 stage. If the customer rejects the 
feasibility quote, then all costs incurred up to the Form 10 stage are written off. 
If the customer accepts the feasibility quote, then the budget quote or Form 15 is prepared. 
3.4.2. The Form 15 (budget) stage 
At Form 15 stage, a multi-disciplinary team consisting of the area planner, the design 
engineer, the environmental practitioner, the land surveyor and the customer executive 
conduct a site visit to validate the network plan. The design engineer is responsible for 
compiling the budget quote, which is forwarded to the customer through the customer 
executive. The budget quote is valid for a period of 90 days (Eskom, 2005:14). 
The Form 15 is vetted at a Technical Evaluation Forum where a project proposal is appraised 
by senior management from a technical as well as a financial perspective. On acceptance of 
the project proposal by the Forum, the customer is issued with a budget quote. The long lead-
time materials and other materials on the critical path of the schedule are ordered on 
acceptance of the budget quote by the customer. However, where materials have lead times of 
more than 3 months, such materials are ordered in the feasibility of Form 10 stage. 
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Should the customer accept the budget quote and subsequently decline, then the customer is 
liable for all costs incurred up to the budget stage. 
The quote at budget stage is binding and the company is liable for any losses incurred should 
the quote be less then the actual project cost. 
The next phase is the constructability or "Form 150" phase. 
3.4.3. The Form 150 (Pre-constructabilitv) stage 
On acceptance of the budget quote, a detailed project package is compiled which includes the 
detailed scope of work and tender documents, detailed survey of the infrastructure, 
environmental reports and risk analysis of the project. The Form 150 is prepared on actual 
tendered rates by the successful contractor based on the bills of quantity from Form 15 stage 
(Eskom, 2005:21). Material orders are received on site and construction commences. The 
project manager delegates authority to the project co-ordinator. All role-players such as the 
project engineer, the surveyor, the clerk-of-works and the contractor report to the project co-
ordinator. The project co-ordinator is responsible for the facilitation of material delivery to 
site. 
The final stage is the constructability, commissioning and handover, also referred to as the 
"Form 101" stage. 
3.4.4. The Form 101 (Constructability) stage 
At this stage the project is constructed and ready for commissioning and handover to the 
customer. The actual project costs are documented and as-built information is uploaded on a 
GIS database for easy referencing of the newly built asset (Eskom, 2005:58). 
Information storage using the GIS database system is necessary for executing maintenance 
and refurbishment work. However, the system does not have warning systems that trigger 
such types of activities(Eskom, 2005:61). 
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3.5. CONCLUSION 
The Eskom supply chain consists of numerous sequential stages. The output of each stage is 
necessary for the input of the next stage (Eskom,2005:55). It is therefore imperative that the 
efficiency of the supply chain is dependent on the efficiency of each stage of the supply chain 
(Eskom, 2005:63). These efficiencies is achievable by managing the variances between stages 
with emphasis on materials and information flow (Hugo et al, 2004:157). 
A study on materials and information flow within the Eskom Supply Chain from two 
independent investigations, namely the exploratory study on human behaviour and that of 
real-time project is discussed in Chapter 5. 
The next Chapter explains the methodology used to gather the data for the afore-mentioned 
investigations. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology of the Research 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the research, the objectives set in achieving this purpose and the design of the 
exploratory study on human behaviour and interaction as well as that of the real-time projects 
and the case study, is explained under the relevant sections. 
4.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem statement is "the impact of the bullwhip effect on throughput in Eskom's supply 
chain". To effectively address the problem statement, a two-prong approach was adopted. 
Firstly, the bullwhip as a consequence of human behaviour was researched and secondly, a 
study into Eskom's real-time projects was investigated. 
4.3. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the extent and impact of the bullwhip effect on 
throughput in Eskom through research into the company's supply chain using the two-
pronged approach outlined in the problem statement. 
4.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The research objectives were three-fold as follows: 
4.4.1. Research Objective One 
To determine the impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect. 
4.4.2. Research Objective Two 
To determine the impact of fluctuation in materials and information flow on the bullwhip. 
4.4.3. Research Objective Three 
To investigate the relationship between research objectives one and two and validating by 
means of a case study. 
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4.5. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The competency levels and skills base of Eskom employees is high. 
4.6. DESIGN OF THE EXPLORATORY STUDY ON HUMAN BEHAVIOUR AND 
INTERACTION 
The design of the study was carried out to effectively address research objective one. 
4.6.1. The Research Population 
The research population for the purposes of this research was targeted towards individuals 
within Eskom's network asset creation supply chain in the Eastern Region. 
The composition of the population included project co-coordinators, project engineers, project 
planners, project schedulers, project controllers, project surveyors, construction supervisors 
and procurement officers. 
4.6.2 . The Research Sample 
The sample composition and size consisted of randomly chosen individuals as follows: 
Table 4.6.2; Sample Composition and Size 




project co-coordinators 5 62 
project engineers 5 62 
project planners 4 66 
project schedulers 3 60 
project controllers 3 66 
project surveyors 4 67 
construction supervisors 4 63 
procurement officers 2 67 
Total 30 
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From Table 4.6.2, the sample size consists of at least 60% of the population size within each 
job profile and is representative of the population size. 
4.6.3. Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire design for behavioural and attitudinal responses was based on Hague 
(1993:118). A series of statements (illustrated in Appendix 1) were designed in accordance 
with simulations from the beer game as has been discussed in Chapter Two of the text as well 
as recommendations made by Lee et al. Statements 14 to 17 were specifically targeted 
towards the behavioural aspect of role-players in the supply chain. The questionnaire was 
distributed to supply chain role-players at random. The respondents had to agree, remain 
neutral or disagree with the statements. The statements were mixed with positive and 
negative statements to avoid "respondents getting into a groove and giving the same answer 
consistently" (Hague 1993:118). 
4.6.4. Response Rate 
A total of 30 questionnaires were distributed and duly completed by 28 respondents, yielding 
a 93% response rate. 
4.6.5. Analysis 
The data from each questionnaire was tallied under the relevant responses. The responses 
were then converted to percentages for ease of discussion. 
4.7. DESIGN OF THE INVESTIGATION ON REAL-TIME PROJECTS 
The design of the study was carried out to effectively address research objective two. 
4.7.1. The Research Population 
The research population for the purposes of this research was chosen as projects completed 
within Eskom in the Eastern Region within the past two years. 
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The population includes power-lines and substation works, refurbishment and new works. 
4.7.2. The Research Sample 
The sample composition and size consisted of randomly chosen projects as follows: 
Table 4.7.2: Sample Composition and Size 
Asset Description Number of projects Sample as Percentage 
of Population 
Substation -new works 12 80% 
Substation-refurbishment 4 82% 
Line-new works 4 80% 
Line-refurbishment 5 79% 
Total 25 
From the above table, the sample size consists of at least 79% of the population size within 
each asset description and is representative of the population size. 
4.7.3. Design format 
The design format chosen was an "Excel "spreadsheet (Table 5.4) for a compatible platform 
to report on time data from "Microsoft Projects" and project status and financial data from the 
"Capital Assistant" database. 
4.7 4. Analysis 
Having extracted project materials cost data from Form 10 through to Form 101, the project 
variance between each project phase was calculated. 
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Form 10 to Form 15 variance is attributed to Long-lead time materials placed and received 
respectively. A similar exercise was done for the cost component of long-lead time materials. 
The time variance was calculated from the project schedules. Materials were expressed as a 
function of cost and time variance between scheduled and actual orders placed. A similar 
exercise was done for material orders received. 
The cost component for long-lead time materials was extracted and expressed as a percentage 
of total materials. 
Materials return-to-stores was captured for each project and expressed as a percentage. The 
materials returns are as a result of surplus over-orders. 
Defective materials that are materials that do not meet with Eskom's specifications and 
standards have been captured in the table. The ratios of defective to total materials have been 
expressed as a percentage. 
The BEE component for each project was extracted due to the increasing demand for 
emerging contractors and in line with Eskom's pact with suppliers (Eskom, 2004c:5). This 
was expressed as a percentage of total materials per project. 
4.7.5. Relationship between the study on human behaviour and the study on real-time 
projects 
A comparison was drawn between research objectives one and two and reported in the study 
of real-time projects. The discussion was structured under the main headings of the causal 
factors of the bullwhip to provide a basis for comparison. 
4.8. DESIGN OF THE CASE STUDY 
The design of the case study (in Chapter 5 Section.5.7.) was carried out to provide validation 
of the findings obtained from the study of human behaviour and interaction and the study of 
real-time projects. 
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4.8.1. The Research Population 
The research population consisted of four projects within Eskom in the Eastern Region 
currently in the construction phase. 
The research population included two power-lines and two substation projects 
4.8.2 . The Research Sample 
The random sample of a refurbishment project was chosen as a case study for discussion. 
4.8.3. Design Data and format 
The design data was in the form of project minutes of the meeting, project forms, bills of 
materials, the scope of work, project and materials costs located in 
4.8.4. Analysis 
The analysis of the case study was in the form of a discussion under the headings of the causal 
factors of the bullwhip. 
4.9. CONCLUSION 
The three objectives of this research, namely to determine the impact of human behaviour on 
the bullwhip effect, to determine the impact of fluctuation in materials and information flow 
on the bullwhip and to investigate the relationship between the afore-mentioned objectives by 
validating by means of a case study was achieved through the relevant research designs. 
The research findings and discussion will follow in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter Five: Research Findings 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the discussion from the results obtained from the exploratory study on 
human behaviour and interaction, the investigation of real-time projects and that of the case 
study that was used to achieve the three objectives of this research, namely to determine the 
impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect, to determine the impact of fluctuation in 
materials and information flow on the bullwhip and to investigate the relationship between 
research objectives one and two and validating by means of a case study. 
5.2. RESULTS OF THE EXPLORATORY STUDY ON HUMAN BEHAVIOUR AND 
INTERACTION 
The sample profile of the participants of the survey is shown in Table. 5.2. The sample 
consisted of randomly selected supply chain role-players namely project coordinators, project 
engineers, project planners, project schedulers, project controllers, project surveyors, 
construction supervisors and procurement officers within Eskom Eastern Region. 
Table 5.2. Sample Profile 







Project coordinators 5 4 62 
project engineers 5 5 62 
project planners 4 4 66 
project schedulers 3 3 60 
project controllers 3 3 66 
project surveyors 4 4 67 
construction supervisors 4 3 63 
procurement officers 2 2 67 
Total 30 28 
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The participants filled in hardcopies of questionnaires as per sample in Appendix 1. All 
participants were based in Pietermaritzburg. The questionnaire consisted of thirty statements. 
The respondents had to agree, remain neutral or disagree with the statements. The statements 
were mixed with positive and negative statements to avoid "respondents getting into a groove 
and giving the same answer consistently" (Hague 1993:118). 
A total of 30 questionnaires were distributed and duly completed by 28 respondents (as shown 
in Table 5.2), yielding a 93% response rate. 
The results of the exploratory study from the questionnaire survey are given in Table 5.3. 
The various responses corresponding to each statement was tallied. The tallied responses 
were then expressed as a percentage to be used in the discussions that follow under section 
5.3. 
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1 There are too many project schedules for the same project 14 50 10 36 0 0 2 7 2 7 
2 Project information is not centrally available and shared by all parties 14 50 12 43 2 7 0 0 0 0 
3 Fast -tracked projects are given priority in material orders placed 0 0 2 7 2 7 7 25 17 61 
4 Long lead time materials orders are placed on time as scheduled 1 4 1 4 0 0 11 39 15 54 
5 Reducing material lead times will ensure timely completion of projects 21 75 5 18 2 7 0 0 0 0 
6 It is preferable to supply materials direct to site than warehouse in New Germany 14 50 11 39 3 11 0 0 0 0 
7 Materials are received timeously on site. 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 29 20 71 
8 Ordering materials in batches such as concrete and paint saves on transportation 18 64 10 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 It is cheaper to order materials in batches as one can make use of discount structures 18 64 8 29 2 7 0 0 0 0 
10 The information available at Form 10 stage is sufficient to do a feasibility quote 0 0 0 0 2 7 6 21 20 71 
11 Customers have sufficient time to respond to the feasibility quote 3 11 22 79 3 11 0 0 0 0 
12 The information available at Form 15 stage is adequate to do a budget quote 1 4 9 32 0 0 18 64 0 0 
13 Customers have sufficient time to respond to the budget quote 2 7 24 86 2 7 0 0 0 0 
14 When the supply of a type of material is scarce, then one may place orders with several supi 17 61 9 32 2 7 0 0 0 0 
15 It is easy to place and then cancel orders with suppliers 18 64 6 21 4 14 0 0 0 0 
16 It is better to over-order materials to ensure that at least the right quantity arrives to site 16 57 12 43 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 Materials not used are easy to get rid off by returning the materials to stores 15 54 11 39 2 7 0 0 0 0 
18 During Form 150 stage, BEE companies are given preference to supply materials 15 54 13 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 Suppliers are chosen based on the lowest tendered price 20 71 8 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 The choice of material suppliers can determine the success of a project 22 79 6 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 Supplier selection and evaluation is done objectively and openly 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 18 23 82 
22 All project roleplayers have an opportunity to evaluate suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 21 22 79 
23 Material quality is often compromised resulting in rework on site 21 75 6 21 1 4 0 0 0 0 
24 Project delays are attributed to poor quality of materials supplied 20 71 B 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Project delays are attributed to materials arrivinq late to site 20 71 8 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 Project delays are attributed to incorrect materials arriving to site 20 71 7 25 1 4 0 0 0 0 
27 Project delays are attributed to incorrect batchinq of materials to site 19 68 7 25 1 4 1 4 0 0 
28 There are no penalties imposed on suppliers for causing project delays 21 75 7 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 There are no lonq term partnerships with qood suppliers 17 61 9 32 0 0 2 7 0 0 
30 Once a project is commissioned, projects are evaluated objectively 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 14 23 82 
5.3. DISCUSSION ON THE FINDINGS OF THE EXPLORATORY STUDY ON 
HUMAN BEHAVIOUR AND INTERACTION 
5.3.1. OVERVIEW 
This section provides an in-depth discussion of the findings from the sample of the population 
of role-players as stipulated in Table 5.2 and the results of Table 5.3. 
In Chapter 2, it was demonstrated that the human behaviour displayed by role-players of the 
beer game simulation were either "safe harbour" or "panic". 
5.3.2. SAFE HARBOUR BEHAVIOUR 
This type of behaviour is illustrated in Statement 16 "It is better to over-order materials to 
ensure that at least the right quantity arrives on site ". 
Figure 5.3.2. It is better to over-order materials to ensure that at least the right quantity 
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As shown in Figure 5.3.2, 57% of the respondents strongly-agreed to the statement while 43% 
agreed, hence a 100% of respondents were in support of Statement 16. 
5.3.2.1. Business Implication of Surplus Materials 
There are a total of 25 completed sub-transmission projects in Eskom over the past two years 
totaling R78,6 million. (The discussions on a quantitative approach pertaining to these 
projects will be discussed in Section 5.5.). Considering that on average, the actual cost of 
material was R2,62 million, a 2% over-order in materials would translate to a total of 
Rl,57million. The funds tied up in stock may have been freed up for the completion of other 
critical projects. 
Another disadvantage of the practice of over-ordering is the carrying costs of the materials at 
Eskom stores situated in New Germany, Pinetown. Surplus materials are stored in anticipation 
for use in other projects. The caution associated with storage is having redundant or obsolete 
stock. According to (Rajkarran, 2006), obsolete stock costs the business in the region of Rl,2 
million to Rl,5 million per annum . 
The extent of the issue with returning materials to stores is summed up by discussing 
respondents' behaviour to Statement 17 "Materials not used are easy to get rid of by 
returning the materials to stores". About 54% of respondents strongly- agreed and 39% 
agreed to the afore-mentioned statement. Approximately 7% of respondents were undecided. 
The business implications of having 93% of respondents in support of Statement 17 are 
increasing stock levels of materials that may or may not be utilized. According to (Young, 
2005), the net revenue generated from the sale of redundant or obsolete stock is only 5% of 
original purchase price. 
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Figure 5.3.2.1. Materials not used are easy to get rid of by returning the materials to 
stores (Statement 17) 
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The business implications of having 93% of respondents in support of Statement 17 are 
increasing stock levels of materials that may or may not be utilized. According to (Young, 
2005), the net revenue generated from the sale of redundant or obsolete stock is only 5% of 
original purchase price. 
5.3.3. PANIC BEHAVIOUR 
The impact on the supply chain from "panic" behaviour is similar to that of "safe harbour". 
Both types of behaviour negatively influence the supply chain as was demonstrated in the 
beer simulation. 
Statement 14, "When the supply of a type of material is scarce, then one may place orders 
with several suppliers" is indicative of "panic" behaviour. From the graph below, 61% of 
respondents strongly agreed to the above-mentioned statement while 32% agreed. 7% were 
undecided. 
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Figure 5.3.3. When the supply of a type of material is scarce, then one may place orders 
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5.3.3.1. Business Implication of "panic" behaviour 
The problem associated with several orders is redundant stock. Furthermore, the levels of 
safety or buffer stock will increase. If this practice continues across projects, then the effect is 
cumulative. The consequences are similar to that discussed under 5.3.2.1. "Business 
implications of surplus materials". 
Another pertinent point to note is that when there are time constraints, for examples in 
projects that are fast-tracked, then role-players are prone to display "panic" behaviour. 
The results of the findings of Statement 3 "Fast-tracked projects are given priority in 
materials orders placed" is illustrated in the graph overleaf. 
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The outcomes of the findings were as follows: 7% of respondents agreed to statement 3 while 
25% disagreed and 61% strongly disagreed. 7% of respondents remained undecided. 
Given that projects are not prioritized according to being fast-tracked (from graph of 
statement 3), role-players may incur penalties in the form of premium costs for materials from 
suppliers to fit fast-tracked deadlines. 
Another consequence of "panic" behaviour is the issue of compromised material quality. This 
issue was addressed in Statement 23: "Material quality is often compromised resulting in 
rework on site ". The results of the findings to statement 23 (as shown in the graph overleaf) 
were as follows: 75% and 21% strongly-agree and agree respectively while 4% remained 
undecided. Majority (96%) of role-players are in support of statement 23. According to 
(Rajkarran, 2006), reworked materials are accepted due to tight project schedules without 
slack components. 
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Furthermore, there is no safety stock to replace the particular component in the interim while 
the inferior component is replaced by the supplier. There is cause for concern as the expected 
material life-cycle is reduced by carrying out rework, for example, on newly galvanized 
steelwork, especially in coastal applications. 
5.3.4. CAUSAL FACTORS OF THE BULL WHIP AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 
The causal factors of the bullwhip effect have been discussed in Chapter Two. However the 
discussions focused on the modification to supply chain processes rather than role-players 
behaviour. The same factors will be the focal point in the discussions to follow but from a 
behavioural perspective. The causal factors were lead time of information and materials, 
centralized versus decentralized information, multiple demand forecasting updating, batch 
ordering, price fluctuation and rationing and shortage gaming. 
49 
5.3.4.1. Lead time of information and materials 
It was noted in section 2.7.1.that the reduction of lead times reduces the bullwhip effect in the 
supply chain. The negative effects of increasing lead times of information and material flow 
were demonstrated in the beer game simulation in section 2.5.1. The research findings based 
on statements 4, 5, 6 and 7 are relevant to the issue on lead times of information and material 
flow. The results of Statement 4: "Long lead time materials orders are placed on time as 
scheduled" were as follows: 4% of respondents strongly agreed and 4% agreed to the 
statement. However, 53% strongly disagreed while 39% disagreed to the statement. The 
graph below illustrates the results of the findings. 
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From the graph, a total of 92% of respondents were not in support of the statement 4. This is 
cause for concern as delays in ordering lead time materials places projects at risk of being 
late. The cumulative effect of such delays is substantive such as loss of revenue by not 
connecting customers on time. 
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Statement 5 "reducing material lead times will ensure timely completion of projects" is in 
line with the theory as mentioned earlier regarding the beer game simulation. Feedback from 
the survey regarding the afore-mentioned statement was as follows: 75% of respondents 
strongly agreed to statement 5 while 18% were in agreement to the statement. 7% of 
respondents were undecided. The results are graphically displayed below. 
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Statement 5 is strongly supported (93%) by respondents within the supply chain. While this 
is the appropriate response, the way forward in implementing this mitigating measure in 
counteracting the bullwhip effect requires discipline. All role-players in the supply chain must 
ensure that there is no variance in the order lead times by adhering to the time-frames 
stipulated on the project schedules. 
The response to Statement 6 "It is preferable to supply materials direct to site than 
warehouse in New Germany" was as follows (as illustrated in the graph overleaf): 50% 
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strongly-agreed while 39% agreed to the statement. 11% of respondents were undecided. 
The inefficiencies of warehousing at New Germany are indicative of the response of a 
majority (89%) of respondents in support of statement 6. According to (van Greneun, 2005), 
materials are often stored in incorrect bins. This causes project delays and additional costs are 
incurred from returning materials back to stores, (van Greneun, 2005) is of the view that 
materials from Johannesburg and destined for Newcastle for example, arrive at New Germany 
and then are transported by Rotran, a transport subsidiary of Eskom back to Newcastle. There 
is double-accounting of transport costs incurred and the problem is compounded as this 
practice occurs over several projects. Rotran costs are about 30% more than the industry 
average. However, Eskom Distribution is obligated by Eskom Corporate to make use of 
Rotran in the first instance before choosing another transport company for the delivery of 
materials from New Germany to site. 
Figure 5.3.4.1(c) It is preferable to supply materials direct to site than warehouse in New 
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On average, the cost of transporting materials is 5% of the total materials cost. In section 
5.1.1, the average materials cost was calculated to be R2.62 million. The transport cost would 
then be approximately R131 000. However by using Rotran, the premium of 30% translates 
to R39 000 per project. The cumulative savings that would have been realized may contribute 
to the funding of other much-needed projects. 
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The extent of turnaround time from ordering materials to receiving it is depicted in Statement 
7: "Materials are received timeously on site". Results of the survey were as follows: 29% 
disagreed while 71% of respondents strongly disagreed to the statement. The results are 
graphically illustrated below. It is deduced that 100% of respondents were not in favour of 
statement 7. According to construction supervisor, (van Rooyen, 2005), at least 90% of 
projects are late due to the late delivery of materials. 
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There are no consequence to suppliers or Eskom supply chain role-players for materials 
arriving late on site. The opportunity costs of late material deliveries are not easily 
quantifiable. Apart from losing revenue that would have been generated by the infrastructure, 
the loss of goodwill may be substantial. The Eskom brand may be less favoured by 
communities that are still without electricity due to project delays. A ripple effect is the risk 
associated with lack of co-operation from communities, for example when negotiating 
servitudes for future powerlines in the same community. 
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5.3.4.2. Centralized versus Decentralized Information 
When customers apply to Eskom for a supply point, the information flow should be shared 
with all stakeholders in the supply chain. As shown in Figure 3.3, planning, engineering, 
environmental, survey, logistics and construction activities form an integral part of the Eskom 
supply chain and information sharing is key to its success. For example, an additional supply 
point for Dunlop Tyres in Howick would require that the planning department determine the 
need and capacity and type of supply required including future demand and other potential 
customers that may require supply from the newly established electrical grid. This 
information is required by the Engineering, Survey and Environmental departments to 
determine the feasibility of the supply and future supply points. The Logistics department 
requires the customer information to determine inventory demand and the construction 
department needs to establish the labour and tooling requirements for the project. 
However when respondents were probed about the extent of information sharing by the use of 
Statement 2: "Project information is not centrally available and shared by all parties ", the 
results were as follows: 50% strongly-agreed, 43% agreed and 7% of respondents were 
undecided. The results are graphically displayed in Figure 6.4.2 (a). 
It is alarming to note that 93% of respondents are of the view that project information is not 
centrally available and shared by all role-players. 
When a customer applies for a point of supply, the customer is initially given a feasibility 
quote and thereafter a budget quote, upon acceptance of the terms and conditions of the 
feasibility quote. The quotation process is integrated in the supply chain as described 
previously in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 5.3.4.2.(a) Proiect information is not centrally available and shared by all parties 
(Statement 2) 
When probed using Statement 10: "The information available at Form 10 stage is sufficient to 
do a feasibility quote", the response was as follows: 71% of respondents strongly-disagreed to 
the statement while 21% disagreed. 7% of respondents were undecided. A total of 92% are 
of the view that information is inadequate to complete the feasibility quote. The results of 
Statement 10, as shown below, are consistent with the results derived from Statement 2. 
The results of Statements 2 and 10 were checked for consistency by probing at the budget 
stage of the quotation process by way of Statement 12: "The information available at Forml5 
stage is adequate to do a budget quote ". The response, as graphically displayed overleaf, was 
as follows: 82% of respondents strongly-disagreed to the statement while 14% disagreed. 4% 
of respondents were undecided. A total of 96% are of the view that information is inadequate 
to complete the budget quote. 
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Figure 5.3.4.2.(b) The information available at Form 10 stage is sufficient to do a 
feasibility quote (Statement 10) 
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The results of Statements 2 and 10 were checked for consistency by probing at the budget 
stage of the quotation process by way of Statement 12: "The information available at Forml5 
stage is adequate to do a budget quote ". The response, as graphically displayed overleaf, was 
as follows: 82% of respondents strongly-disagreed to the statement while 14% disagreed. 4% 
of respondents were undecided. A total of 96% are of the view that information is inadequate 
to complete the budget quote. 
In summary, over 90% of respondents are not sharing project information from a centralized 
source. Furthermore, feasibility and budget quotes are estimated without the availability of 
complete information. The findings are consistent with the process, where the engineering 
department prepares the quotes. The quotation is done in isolation from the role-players in 
the supply chain. 
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Figure 5.3.4.2.(c) The information available at Form 15 stage is adequate to do a budget 
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The time-frame for obtaining a response from the customer at the feasibility quote stage was 
investigated using Statement 11: "Customers have sufficient time to respond to a feasibility 
quote ". 
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Figure 5.3.4.2.(d) Customers have sufficient time to respond to the feasibility quote 
(Statement f f) 
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The response, as shown graphically, was as follows: 11% of respondents strongly-agreed to 
the statement while 79% disagreed. 11 % of respondents were undecided. A total of 90% of 
respondents are of the view that customers are given too much time to make a decision 
regarding the quote. The findings are consistent with the Eskom process as discussed in 
Chapter 3, where the customer is given 60 days to respond to the quote. According to 
(Pieterse, 2005), this time-frame is not strictly adhered to and projects are accepted with up to 
120 days without revising the quote and re-quoting the customer. 
At the budget stage, a similar response was noted. The probe using Statement 13: 
"Customers have sufficient time to respond to a budget quote" yielded the following results: 
7 % of respondents strongly-agreed to the statement while 86% disagreed. 7% of respondents 
were undecided. The results are shown graphically in Figure 6.4.2.(e). 
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Figure 5.3.4.2.(e) Customers have sufficient time to respond to the budget quote 
(Statement 13) 
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A total 93% of respondents maintain that customers are given too much time to make a 
decision regarding the budget quote. The findings are consistent with the Eskom process as 
discussed in Chapter 3, where the customer is given 90 days to respond to the quote. 
Eskom's Customer Executive Officer, (Pieterse, 2005), is of the view that the customers take 
up to 200 days to respond to the budget quote. The budget quote is no longer valid, but it is 
accepted because of the lengthy paperwork to re-vise and re-approve the Form 15 and prepare 
another quote. 
5.3.4.3. Demand forecast updating 
The advantages of using and sharing centralized information flow have been demonstrated in 
the previous section. It is logical to have one demand schedule from which all role-players 
can peg crucial need dates for various activities. 
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However, in Eskom, multiple demand schedules are set in isolation of the supply chain role-
players. A priority schedule (updated once a year) has been drawn up by the Network 
Services Manager (NSM) with the primary objective of optimizing cash flow, independent of 
customer need dates and resource constraints. The Project Engineering Manager (PEM) has 
set up demand schedules (updated every 6 months) with his staff to distribute the work load 
equitably, independent of the priority list. The Project Manager has drawn up demand 
schedules (updated every 2 weeks) without any liaison with both the NSM and PEM. The 
demand forecast is then not a true reflection of the actual customer plan. 
When respondents were probed using Statement 1: "There are too many project schedules for 
the same project", the response (shown graphically below) was as follows: 57% of 
respondents strongly-agreed while 43% agreed to the statement. All respondents are in 
agreement of statement 1. 
Figure 5.3.4.3. There are too many project schedules for the same project (Statement 1) 
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5.3.4.4. Batch Ordering 
While it makes economic sense to order materials in batches as discussed in Lee et al 
(1997:96), Saunders, M. (1997:210) differs by arguing that it is inefficient in waiting to fill 
large batch orders, as resources are employed to produce the materials that are not required 
immediately. 
According to (Ferns, 2005), when orders are placed in batches, such as paint and concrete, the 
suppliers send the entire quantity ordered instead of receiving the materials when required. 
The Georgedale Northdene 88kV line refurbishment project is a typical example of the 
problems experienced due to incorrect batching and will be discussed at length in section 
5.6.of the case study. 
The probe using Statement 8: "Ordering materials in batches such as concrete and paint 
saves on transportation " yielded the following results: 64 % of respondents strongly-agreed 
to the statement while 36% agreed to the statement. All respondents are in agreement with 
Statement 8. 
Figure 5.3.4.4.(a) Ordering materials in batches such as concrete and paint saves on 
transportation (Statement 8) 
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As has been discussed in the literature review, orders are required to be spread evenly to 
reduce the bullwhip effect due to batch ordering. 
Incorrect batching, for example, increasing batch size to reduce transportation costs, 
aggravates the bullwhip where lead times of materials are extended to fill truckloads. The 
time slippage has a direct impact on project delays. 
When respondents were probed about delays caused by incorrect batching of materials to site, 
by the use of Statement 27: "Project delays are attributed to incorrect batching of materials 
to site ", the results were as follows: 68% strongly-agreed, 24% agreed, 4% were undecided 
and 4% of respondents disagreed with the statement. Majority (92%) of respondents are in 
support of Statement 27. 
According to construction supervisor, Jacobus van Rooyen, about 95% of high voltage line 
projects are delayed due to incorrect batches of steelwork, reinforcing bars, concrete and paint 
arriving to site. 
Figure 5.3.4.4.(b) Project delays are attributed to incorrect batching of materials to site 
(Statement 27) 
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5.3.4.5 Price Fluctuation 
Suppliers of products such as paint or powerline hardware, offer a tiered discount structure 
linked to the number of items purchased. The larger the volumes purchased, the greater is the 
discount. 
According to Director, Tim Krishna from paint supplier, Optima Coatings, the company's 
discount structure is as follows: purchase orders of 10-50 units -5% discount, 51-100 units-
10% discount and greater than 200 units qualify for 30% discount of the purchase price. 
When respondents were probed about the use of discount structures in Statement 9: "It is 
cheaper to order materials in batches as one can make use of discount structures", the 
outcome was as follows: 64% strongly-agreed, 29% agreed and 7% were undecided. Majority 
(93%) of respondents agreed to Statement 27. The findings are consistent with the literature 
review and research by Lee et al (1997:97). The Case Study in Chapter 8 will give further 
impetus on the subject. 
Figure 5.3.4.5. It is cheaper to order materials in batches as one can make use of 
discount structures (Statement 9) 
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5.3.4.6. Rationing and Shortage Gaming 
The concept of rationing and gaming has been dealt with in Section 2.6.6. of the literature 
review. An example of the concept was cited by Project Co-ordinator, Dave Barrowman 
during the refurbishment of the Colenso Gowrie 88kV powerline. Additional cables referred 
to as "Hare conductor" were ordered for the project due to a countrywide shortage of this 
particular cable. The cables were used to replace temporary cables which were installed after 
the theft of the copper cabling. The additional orders had been requisitioned due to the 
anticipation of future theft. 
Additional orders are returned to New Germany stores rather than the materials suppliers. 
The materials are stored in anticipation for use in future projects. The discussion on materials 
returns will be addressed in section 5.5. 
The research finding of the questionnaire survey on the above-mentioned concept was 
explored through two statements, namely statements 9 and 14. Statement 9: "It is easy to 
place and then cancel orders with suppliers". The results were as follows: 64% strongly-
agreed, 21% agreed and 14% were undecided. Majority (85%) of respondents were in 
agreement with the statement. 
Figure 5.3.4.6. It is easy to place and then cancel orders with suppliersfStatement 15) 
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Statement 9 has been analysed and discussed under Section 5.3.4.5. and will not be repeated 
here. 
5.3.4.7. Supplier Selection and Evaluation 
A distinction in low value and high value purchasing is made by Burt et al (2003:332); in low 
value purchases, the evaluation is not as stringent as in high value purchasing. For purchases 
of low value, the evaluation is made by looking at information from websites, or mail. For 
high value purchases, the procedures may involve conducting supplier surveys, conducting 
financial analyses, carrying out site visits to plants, conducting quality, capacity and service 
checking. 
The evaluation process may be based on a set of selection criteria and corresponding rating 
based on its weighting. According to Burt et al (2003:336), an assessment is based on the 
numerical ratings as well as site investigations. As Preis (2003:36) points out, that the 
evaluation process and rating system must be objective by choosing criteria such as price, 
performance and quality rather than just interpersonal satisfaction to ensure an effective 
evaluation. 
Suppliers are selected from those that passed the evaluation process. Sourcing criteria by 
bidding or negotiation or both provides a basis for choosing the successful supplier. The 
importance of a good supplier is highlighted in the next section on strategic partnerships and 
supplier integration. 
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Figure 5.3.4.7.(a) During the Form 150 stage, BEE companies are given preference to 
supply materials (Statement 18) 
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The research finding on supplier selection and evaluation was explored through Statements 
18, 19, 20 21, 22, 28 and 30. 
Statement 18: "During Forml50 stage, BEE companies are given preference to supply 
materials". The results were as follows: 54% strongly-agreed and 46% agreed to the 
statement. The findings (100% of respondents) are in agreement with ESKADAAX7, 
Eskom's purchasing pact with suppliers, which is available online. 
According to the document, tenders are awarded on lowest price only, or on a set of criteria 
such as technical merit, quality and BEE contractor and subcontractor status. 
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An analysis of the results obtained from Statement 19: "Suppliers are chosen based on lowest 
tendered price". The results from respondents were as follows: 71% strongly-agreed and 
29% agreed to the statement. The result (100% of respondents agreeing to Statement 19) is 
cause for concern as the lowest tenderer is not necessarily the most suitable in terms of 
rendering a product or service that complies with stringent specifications and standards. 
According to Tucker (2005), no company should be competing on price alone but rather by 
the value it is offering. 
When respondents were probed about materials suppliers in Statement 20: "The choice of 
materials suppliers can determine the success of a project", the outcome was as follows: 79% 
strongly-agreed and 21% agreed to Statement 20. According to ESKADAAX7, Eskom's 
purchasing pact with suppliers, the responsibilities of both parties form part of the pact. A 
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suspension procedure for suppliers that are repeat offenders or unscrupulous, is included in 
the document. Further documentation developed regionally; include the issuing of a non-
conformance report for any aspect pertaining to materials for example poor quality or damage 
in transit. Any supplier that has a total of three or more non-conformance reports is 
suspended from the vendor list. 
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The problem is in the implementation phase. Site-personnel are reluctant to fill in the report 
as it requires reams of paperwork and a follow-up procedure. It then becomes challenging to 
successfully discipline suppliers when the information obtained by site personnel is not a true 
reflection of actual events. 
The selection and evaluation of suppliers were investigated by the use of Statement 21: 
"Supplier selection and evaluation is done objectively and openly". The results of the 
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findings were as follows: 82% of respondents strongly-disagreed and 18% disagreed to 
Statement 21. Some of the reasons expressed by supply chain role-players were that not all 
stake-holders are consulted during the tender and adjudication process. For instance, 
technical staff were omitted from the adjudication and tenders have been awarded from an 
economic perspective (Eskom 2003:320). This practice is not feasible as in some instances; 
the successful tenderer was awarded the contract based on a scope of work that could not be 
executed practically. One such example was the construction of 60km of 132kV powerline 
from Vergenoeg to Pongola in 2001. There were 2 pylons that could not be conventionally 
installed in an environmentally-sensitive area consisting of aloes and proteas. The solution 
was to use a 10 ton capacity helicopter at a cost of approximately R100 000. The contractor 
costs for labour trebled as this was a variation order (Eskom 2003:321). Had the 
environmentalists and engineers been party to the contract documentation, this compensation 
event would have been avoided. 
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The participation of role-players in decision making is probed using Statement 22: "All 
project role-players have an opportunity to evaluate suppliers ". The outcome of the probe 
was as follows: 79% of respondents strongly-disagreed and 21% disagreed to Statement 22. 
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The findings are aligned with that of Statement 21 where role-players are not consulted in the 
decision-making process. 
Another cross-check for consistency in the results is through the use of Statement 30: "Once a 
project is commissioned, projects are evaluated objectively". The results of the findings were 
as follows: 82% of respondents strongly-disagreed, 14% disagreed and 4% were undecided to 
Statement 30. Hence the findings are consistent with that obtained from Statements 21 and 
22. This gives further impetus to the fact that there is no consultation with an all-inclusive 
team of project role-players during the project life-cycle. 
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One of the main activities within the supply chain is information flow. From the findings it is 
evident that information flow has been restricted. 
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From an Eskom point of view, the question one may ask is what recourse is there for poor-
performing suppliers?. The question was addressed through Statement 28: "There are no 
penalties imposed on suppliers for causing project delays ". The results of the findings were 
as follows: 75% of respondents strongly-agreed, 25% agreed to Statement 28. Project delays 
are attributed to supplier stock-outs or defective materials arriving to site which may require 
rework. 
The opportunity costs due to stock-outs or rework are not passed on to the supplier. Penalties 
should be imposed that are consistent with the level of risk. For example, projects that supply 
strategic customers such as Richards Bay Minerals (RBM), should have higher penalties built 
in the contract than non-critical refurbishment projects. 
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The opportunity costs due to stock-outs or rework are not passed on to the supplier. Penalties 
should be imposed that are consistent with the level of risk. For example, projects that supply 
strategic customers such as Richards Bay Minerals (RBM) should have higher penalties built 
in the contract than non-critical refurbishment projects (Eskom 2003:331). Likewise the 
opposite should hold true. For emergency projects, for instance when infrastructure has been 
damaged by storms and has to be restored immediately, incentives need to be built in 
contracts with negotiated suppliers to expedite restoration of such infrastructure (Eskom 
2003:352). 
5.3.4.8. Strategic Partnerships and Supplier Integration 
The importance of strategic partnerships and supplier integration cannot be under-estimated as 
has been demonstrated in the literature survey (Burt et al, 2003:336, Preis 2003:36). The lack 
of such integration is a major cause of the buUwhip effect. The investigation into the extent 
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of such partnerships was probed through Statement 29: "There are no long term partnerships 
with good suppliers". The results from respondents were as follows: 61% strongly-agreed, 
32% agreed and 7% disagreed with the statement. Majority (93%) of respondents are in 
agreement with statement 29. . 
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The findings are cause for concern as it has been demonstrated in the literature survey that the 
benefits of supplier integration leads to improved logistics, lower costs, lower stock levels and 
reliability in delivery times . 
Statements 24, 25 and 26 follow a similar trend to cross-check the validity of Statement 29. 
Statement 24: "Project delays are attributed to poor quality of materials supplied". The 
results of the survey were as follows: 71% strongly-agreed and 29% agreed with the 
statement. The solution is to perform quality checks at the source, so that any anomalies may 
be rectified before the equipment or product is installed. 
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Statement 26: "Project delays are attributed to incorrect materials arriving to site". The 
root cause of the problem pertaining to incorrect materials getting to site is attributed to 
incorrect batching. For example, a truckload of goods may contain deliveries to several sites 
and due to the large order filled; it is easy to deliver the incorrect materials to site. 
The results from respondents for Statement 26 were as follows: 71% strongly-agreed, 25% 
agreed and 4% disagreed with the statement. Majority (96%) of respondents were in 
agreement with Statement 26. The knock-on effect of project delays as a result of incorrect 
materials arriving to site may not be easily quantifiable. For instance, the opportunity costs 
for not having a point of supply on time may lead to disgruntled communities working against 
the interests of Eskom and any other future developments in the area. 
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The results from respondents for Statement 25 (Figure 5.3.4.8.d.) were as follows: 71% 
strongly-agreed and 29% agreed to the statement. The late delivery of materials are due to 
double handling that occurs when materials arrive from the supplier to New Germany stores 
and then from the stores to site. A substantial savings is realized in both time and cost if 
materials are sent directly from the supplier to site, avoiding the double-handling of materials. 
Other reasons for materials arriving late to site are supplier-related or company related or 
both. For instance, suppliers may not adhere to delivery schedules or where suppliers are 
over-committed. Company-related issues may arise when the materials scheduler enters in 
unrealistic material need dates on the SAP system. For example, a transformer has a lead 
time of eight to twelve months and anything less is unrealistic. However, there have been a 
number of reported incidents by the PC of this type of materials schedule. Hence there is no 
"flagging" mechanism to minimize the population of incorrect data into the SAP system. 
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Table S.4. Results from real-time project data 
ID Pr*l*et Name F10 F15 BEE% Mat return* 




% of total 
matarlala 
illi lumber of suppliers 
12034 
Ed«Kllllo20MVA132/22kV 
Traraformer Establish R 3,104,000 R 4,140,025 »£.._.. . R 62,278 1.3 R 32,378 0.8 10 1 
EP200322S197126 
Nongoma SS N870 Equip 22 kV 
F i t d t r Bay R 274.740 R 246,054 43.2 R 59,682 24.3 R 15,279 14.9 15 3 
EP2003225197228 Lud*k* 132-22kV 20MVA SS *st R 5,869,000 R 10.806.61 48.6 R 34,897 0.3 R 15.072 0.2 8 2 
EP2003225197238 Eros-Dumasl 132kV Lud*k* T * * Lin* R 2,362,600 R 5,376,441 44.4 R 59,361 1.1 R 11,496 0.3 8 4 
EP2003225580657 
attmm Hiootn* now urn i t ! 
Insulator ra*rr*ng*m*nt for rood R 51,950 R 63,552 45.6 R 89,551 73.2 R 1,698 1.6 19 1 
EP2003225580827 
Mtwarum* 68/11kV SS - InstoUatlon of 
NECR/Aux R 60,000 R 93,721 52.2 R 33,565 29.3 R 5.235 6.3 12 1 
EP2004230663314 
HovrickSS- 2 • 11 kV Fe*d*r Bays Tor 
Dunlop R 207,508 R 263,351 36.1 R 25,566 9.6 R 4,587 2.9 14 5 
EP2004231238782 Empangonl Ngoyo 88kV Lino R 500,000 R 1,423,676 63.0 R 49,682 3.5 R 8,956 2.0 6 3 
N010145 Empongonl Mandlnl 88kV Lino Rofurb R 8,631,146 R 7,137,547 41.6 R 155,897 1.2 R 58,562 0.5 19 2 
N010230 Empangonl Umfolozi 88kV Lin* Rofurb R 14,284,327 R 14,570,69 69.3 R 69,875 0.6 R 7,868 0.1 21 1 
N010347 Madungals SS 11 kV board upgrade R 1,270,000 R 1,379.171 32.1 R 56,569 3.2 R 4,582 0.3 12 1 
N020009 Dam*ll 22/11 kV SS R*furb R 576.660 R 560,750 75.8 R 23,655 3.1 R 4,897 0.6 18 1 
N020011 HIHbrow 22/11kV SS Rofurblihmonl R 543,216 R 494,582 43.3 R 54,468 9.1 R 1,544 0.3 14 3 
N020096 
St Lucia 22/11 kV S/S Relocation & 
Upgrada R 5,700,000 R 5,160,992 28.1 R 98,323 1.8 R 94,456 1.9 5 5 
N020149 
Empanganl Eshowc B8kV Lin* 
R*Turblshm*nt R 4,683,640 R 4,946,495 90.8 R 101,986 1.7 R 98,454 1.7 9 3 
N020154 Nqabeni T « * Lin* R 1,000,000 R 1,505,199 56.9 R 112.589 6.8 R 5,468 0.3 13 4 
N020192 Wetherby132 88kV substation R 7,000,000 R 5,765,427 44.6 R 156,021 2.7 R 8,954 0.2 6 1 
N020194 
W*th*rby turn In Unas (Kokstad 
W*th*rby88kVlln*) R 359,000 R 330,307 62.6 R 26,822 3.9 R 5,489 0.8 4 1 
N030022 PMB Aroo, Substation Security R 800,000 R 374,123 39.7 R 25,698 3.8 R 5,698 1.1 5 1 
N030139 
Mtubatubo SS Naw Retlc F**d*r Bay 
22kV R 246,129 R 577,206 40.8 R 65,982 11.4 R 6,569 1.4 13 3 
N970429 Noab*nl132 22kVSSEst R 5,500,000 R 4,330,753 S2.3 R 53,456 1.1 R 6,985 0,1 14 2 
N990060 
wmowtord Wembezl 33kV T * * 62 
(Mdwebu Tag) R 1,380.000 R 1,397,475 34.7 R 34.546 2.2 R 9,865 0.6 7 5 
N990061 
Mdwebu 33 11kv SS Establishment 
N990061 rov 1 R 1,200,000 R 2.527.378 74.1 R 35,454 1.0 R 5,499 0.2 14 1 
N990111 Orlefonteln SS Rofurb R 468.579 R 675,796 74.1 R 45,665 6.0 R 6,546 0.9 12 1 
N990134 Greylown 33kV SS Refurbishment R 373,132 R 1,043,680 30.4 R 25,689 1.6 R 56,856 3.6 1 
R 1,557,277 R 482,983 278 
(Eskom, 2003:2-50) 
Table 5.8. Results from real-time project data t 
ID Project Name F10 F15 BEE% Mat returns 













Georgedsie Northdono 88kV Lino 1 
R*furblshm*nt R 1,070,041 R 7,803,838 36.6 R 180,000 3.1 R 180,000 #VALUE! 10 1 
(Eskom, 2003:1-12) 
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5.5. DISCUSSION ON THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ON REAL-TIME 
PROJECTS 
The study focused on 25 completed projects within Eskom Eastern Region spanning over a 
three year cycle. The projects were a mix of power lines and substations, new or refurbished. 
The detailed mix and population size was stipulated in Table 4.7.2. of Chapter 4. 
Where possible, this section is arranged under similar headings of section 5.3. for ease of 
comparison between the two independent studies. 
5.5.1. SAFE HARBOUR BEHAVIOUR 
As there are no repercussions for over-ordering of materials, the stores at New Germany 
becomes a dumping ground for excess materials in anticipation for use in future projects that 
may or may not materialize. The extent of the problem is illustrated in Figure 5.5.1 below. 
Figure 5.5.1. Material Returns as a percentage of Total Materials 




The cost of materials returns is expressed as a percentage of totals materials per project. The 
total cost of the materials returned was approximately R1.6 million which is 2% of the total 
material project cost. As discussed in the previous chapter, the funds could have been spent 
on more capital projects instead of been tied up in excess stock. 
The results are consistent with the behaviour of supply-chain role-players over-ordering 
materials. 
5.5.2. PANIC BEHAVIOUR 
An analysis of the projects has shown that orders were placed with up to five different 
suppliers for the same product as illustrated in Figure 5.5.2. For the purpose of this exercise, 
the focus was on one scarce product, namely a dead end assembly (that is various clamping 
components of a conductor attachment to various equipment including pylons). 
Figure 5.5.2. Number of suppliers for scarce materials 
Number of suppliers for dead end assemblies across projects 
o 3 
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The problem with a multiple-supplier strategy is the bullwhip caused in the supply-chain of 
the supplier as a result of cancelled orders. The analysis is in agreement with the findings of 
Statement 14 in the previous section. 
5.5.3. LEAD TIME OF INFORMATION AND MATERIALS 
5.5.3.1. Material Orders Placed 
Long lead time materials are shown as "F10-15" in Figure 5.5.3.1. (a). The variance is due to 
the time lapse from when long-lead time materials should have been ordered as scheduled to 
when they were actually ordered. 
Figure 5.5.3.1.(a). Time variance in material orders placed 











Similarly other materials are shown as "F15-150" with variance in orders placed. The 
variance in orders is consistent with the findings expressed by respondents of Statement 4 in 
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the previous section. One plausible reason for the delay in placement of materials is the 
incomplete information punched into the SAP system by the materials scheduler. The 
procurement officer has then to query the information which takes time. Another reason is 
the delay by customers in committing to funding of long-lead time materials. Also the Eskom 
policy in seeking three quotes for small items is bottlenecking the supply chain process. The 
procurement officers end up spending 80% of his or her time chasing 20% of materials. 
The combined variance in time for all orders placed is indicated by "TotalVar F10-150". 
The cost variance due to estimating the materials cost to the actual costs when quotations are 
received, is illustrated in Figure 5.5.3.1. (b). This variation could have been avoided had there 
been long term partnerships with suppliers. 
Figure 5.5.3.1.(b). Cost variance in material orders placed 









When materials forecasts are done, the projected figures are used. Hence the forecast is 
substantially inaccurate as shown in Figure 7.4. The consequential impact is on the regional 
KPI, where funds are allocated to regions according to their forecasts; the more accurate the 
forecast, the better is the KPI and subsequently the slice of the bonus pool. 
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More effort needs to be placed on follow-up on long-lead time materials as on average, 50% 
of all material costs and time in a project is attributed to long-lead time materials (Eskom, 
2003:431-3). Figure 5.5.3.1. (c) illustrates the long lead time materials as a percentage of 
overall materials per project. Project procurement officers must therefore focus on getting the 
long-lead time materials within time and cost as a priority than diluting their efforts on 
chasing short-lead time materials. This approach follows the ABC inventory application of 
the Pareto principle, where resources must focus on the "few critical inventory" than the 
"many trivial ones (Heizer and Render, 2001:475). 
These materials should be stored by the supplier which is advantageous for the following 
reasons: firstly, the project time and cost risk is passed onto the supplier and secondly 
valuable warehousing space is freed up for strategic stock and spares. 
Figure 5.5.3.1. (c). Long-lead time materials as a percentage of total materials 
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(Eskom, 2003:1-547) 
The establishment of long-term partnerships with suppliers will ensure consistency in costs 
and time especially for long-lead time materials. 
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5.5.3.2. Material Orders Received 
The variance between the scheduled times of receiving materials to the actual time they are 
received on site, is illustrated by "Fl50-101" in Figure 5.5.3.2 (a). The total variance in the 
supply of materials is illustrated by "TotalVartime". The findings are consistent with 
Statement 7 of the previous section, where 100% of respondents have indicated that materials 
are not received timeously on site. 
Figure 5.5.3.2. (a). Time variance in material orders received 




The cost variance in materials received is shown in Figure 5.5.3.2. (b). this variance is 
attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, fluctuations in exchange rate due to the delays in 
ordering the materials. Secondly, change in order quantities due to project scope creep. 
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Thirdly, incomplete or inaccurate information flow between procurement and supplier 
(Eskom, 2003:10). 
The business implications of major fluctuations in materials cost is severe. A financial rolling 
plan is drawn up quarterly and submitted to Eskom Corporate Division for finance. Finance 
is distributed based on the forecasted financial figures in the rolling plan. The knock-on 
effect on effect of not having finance when required in a specified time-frame is detrimental 
as project would then have to be delayed until the next quarter. (Eskom, 2003:6). 
Furthermore, the projected and actual costs are monitored and there are Key Performance 
Indicators (KPI's) for financial instruments as was illustrated in Chapter One which 
ultimately become part of the Regional Performance Report. 
Figure 5.5.3.2. (b). Cost variance in material orders received 
Cost Variance in Material Orders Receiwd 
200.0% , 




5.5.4. SUPPLIER SELECTION AND EVALUATION 
The supplier selection is done according to Eskom's purchasing pact with suppliers and has 
been discussed in the previous section. BEE companies are given preference to supply 
materials as indicated by the exploratory study (Eskom 2004c:l-21). An analysis of the BEE 
component in the sample of projects is illustrated in Figure 5.5.4. This component constitutes 
57% of the total materials supplied for all projects in the sample. 
It was noted that there has been no detailed briefing of BEE suppliers into the business. 
These suppliers do not visit Eskom construction sites and are only partially aware of the 
application of the product that they are supplying. For instance, a BEE supplier (called 
Supplier X for anonymity) tendered to supply specialized screw anchor foundation for pylons. 
Supplier X owned a hardware store and tendered for the project based on domestic screws as 
he had no knowledge of the application (Eskom:2003,101-102). 
Figure 5.5.4. BEE component as a percentage of total materials 
BEE component as % of Total Materials 








5.5.5. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND SUPPLIER INTEGRATION 
There are no long term relationships with suppliers due to preference given to BEE companies 
as shown in Figure 5.5.4. (Eskom, 2004c:l-21). The results obtained in Figure 5.5.4. are 
consistent with the findings of Statement 18, where 100% of respondents agreed that BEE 
companies were given preference to supply materials. These companies will need to develop 
a good track record to prove their reliability as long-term suppliers. 
One of the metrics used to measure material quality is the number of defective materials 
(Eskom, 2003:5-18). As shown in Figure 5.5.5 (a), the cumulative cost of defective materials 
was R482 993. The consequential costs are substantial. For instance the direct labour cost of 
delays due to standing time from defective materials is 278 days. This translates to a cost of 
R2.78 million as the standing time for construction is on average RIO 000 per day. The 
delays per project due to defective materials are illustrated in Figure 5.5.5 (b). 
Figure 5.5.5. (a). Defective materials as a percentage of total materials 







Figure 5.5.5. (b). Project delays due to defective materials 
Project Delays to due to Defective Materials 
Project ID'S 
(Eskom, 2003:1-547) 
From the discussions, it is evident that the results obtained from the exploratory study on 
human behaviour and interaction and the investigation of real-time projects are consistent 
with the impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect and the impact of fluctuation in 
materials and information flow on the bullwhip. Major fluctuations materials and information 
flow was attributed to both the impact of human behaviour as well as the impact of fluctuation 
from the supply chain process. 
The next section provides a discussion on the comparison of the two independent studies, that 
is, the study on human behaviour and the study on real-time projects. 
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5.6. DISCUSSION ON THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE STUDY ON HUMAN 
BEHAVIOUR AND THE STUDY ON REAL-TIME PROJECTS 
A comparison was drawn between the results obtained from Table 5.3. and 5.4. The 
discussion was structured under the main headings of the causal factors of the bullwhip to 
provide a basis for comparison. 
5.6.1. SAFE HARBOUR BEHAVIOUR 
In the study of real-time projects, it was illustrated in Figure 5.5.1. that the total cost of the 
materials returned to New Germany Stores was approximately R1.6 million which is 2% of 
the total material project cost. As discussed in the previous section, the funds could have 
been spent on more capital projects instead of been tied up in excess stock. 
A comparison with Figure 5.3.2. of the study on human behaviour has shown that 100% of 
respondents were in support of Statement 16: "It is better to over-order materials to ensure 
that at least the right quantity arrives on site ". Hence the results are consistent with the study 
on real-time projects. 
5.6.2. PANIC BEHAVIOUR 
In the study on real-time projects, it was shown in Figure 5.5.2, that orders were placed with 
up to five different suppliers for the same scarce product. 
A comparison of Figure 5.3.3 of the study on human behaviour of Statement 14, "When the 
supply of a type of material is scarce, then one may place orders with several suppliers" has 
shown that 93% of respondents were in support of the statement. Hence the results are 
consistent with the study on real-time projects. 
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5.6.3. LEAD TIME OF INFORMATION AND MATERIALS 
5.6.3.1. Material Orders Placed 
In the study of real-time project, it was shown that long lead time materials had chronic 
variances as illustrated in Figure 5.5.3.1. (a). The variance was due to the time lapse from 
when long-lead time materials should have been ordered as scheduled to when they were 
actually ordered. 
In the study on human behaviour, the results of Statement 4: "Long lead time materials 
orders are placed on time as scheduled" were as follows: 4% of respondents strongly agreed 
and 4% agreed to the statement. However, 53% strongly disagreed while 39% disagreed to 
the statement as illustrated in Figure 5.3.4.1.(a). Hence there is consistency between the two 
independent studies. 
5.6.3.2. Material Orders Received 
In the study on real-time projects it was shown in Figure 5.5.3.2 (a), that the variance between 
the scheduled times of receiving materials to the actual time was erratic. 
In the study on human behaviour, the extent of turnaround time from ordering materials to 
receiving it was illustrated through Statement 7: "Materials are received timeously on site ". 
Results of the survey were as follows: 29% disagreed while 71% of respondents strongly 
disagreed to the statement. It is deduced that 100% of respondents were not in favour of 
Statement 7. The findings are consistent with that obtained from the study of real-time 
projects. 
5.6.4. SUPPLIER SELECTION AND EVALUATION 
In the study on real-time projects, the supplier selection was done according to Eskom's 
purchasing pact with suppliers, where BEE companies were awarded the project as illustrated 
in Figure 5.5.4. 
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In the study on human behaviour, it was demonstrated through Statement 18: "During 
Forml50 stage, BEE companies are given preference to supply materials". The results were 
as follows: 54% strongly-agreed and 46% agreed to the statement. The findings (100% of 
respondents) are in agreement with ESKADAAX7, Eskom's purchasing pact with suppliers 
and consistent with the study on real-time projects. 
5.6.5. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS AND SUPPLIER INTEGRATION 
In the study on real-time projects it was shown that there were no long term relationships with 
suppliers due to preference given to BEE companies as shown in Figure 5.5.4. (Eskom, 
2004c: 1-21). 
In the study on human behaviour similar results obtained through Statement 18, where 100% 
of respondents agreed that BEE companies were given preference to supply materials. Hence 
there is consistency in between the two studies. 
The next section provides an overview and discussion of the case study. 
5.7. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY 
The purpose of the case study is to validate the third objective of this study, namely the 
relationship between the impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect and the impact of 
the fluctuation in materials and information flow on the bullwhip. 
The Georgedale Northdene Lotuspark 88-kV powerlines consist of the Georgedale Northdene 
and Georgedale Lotuspark powerlines. Both powerlines share common pylons and are an 
alternative back-up to Durban Municipality. The powerlines supply numerous traction 
substations owned by Spoornet and Metro-rail. The trigger for the refurbishment was the poor 
condition of the earthwire (the wire that runs on the peak of the pylon to shield it from 
lightning), the poor condition of the insulation and corroded pylons. The project is about 70% 
complete and scheduled for completion by the end of August 2006. 
As both powerlines are identical and have the same scopes of works and costs, the focus will 
be on one, namely the Georgedale Northdene powerline. 
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5.7.1. Project Minutes 
There has been more than 15 meetings held to date. For the purpose of this study, Minutes of 
the meeting Number 13 are included in Appendix 2: project data reference. 
5.7.2. Project Forms 
The project forms may be viewed in Appendix2: project data reference. The forms consist of 
Forms 10, 15, 150. The Form 101 is not complete as the project is still under construction. 
5.7.3. Project Bills of Materials (BOM) 
The BOM (Revision 13) is included in the Appendix2: project data reference. 
5.7.4. The scope of work 
The scope of work is as follows: 
• Paint 225 pylons 
• Relabel 225 pylons 
• Re-string 69km of earthwire 
• Replace 1715 glass disk insulators and all associated hardware 
• Clear the servitude of trees and shrubs 
5.7.5. The total project costs 
The total project cost was Rl 110 041 (FormlO) and R 9 067 062 (Form 15). This is a 
variance of 716.8% (F10-F15). The project cost at F150 was R12 040 295, which is a 
variance of 32.8% (F15-F150). 
5.7.6. Material Costs 
The materials cost was estimated at Rl 070 041 (Form 10). The Form 15 materials cost was 
R7 803 838 (The combined value of materials and paint contract on Page 2). This is a 
variance of 629.3%. The Form 150 material cost was R5 874 030. (The combined value of 
materials and paint contract on Page 2). This is variance of 24.7% . 
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5.8. RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDY 
The case study was chosen from a total of four projects within Eskom in the Eastern Region 
currently in the construction phase. 
The results of the case study are shown in Table 5.8. The discussions are structured in 
accordance with the causal factors of the bullwhip for comparison. 
5.9. DISCUSSION OF THE CASE STUDY 
The ensuing discussion will be structured to address the objectives of the study. 
5.9.1. The impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect 
5.9.1.1. Safe Harbour Strategy 
According to Nienhaus et al (2003:5), human co-makers act as "safe harbours" in the supply 
chain. This implies that this group of co-makers order more than is required thereby 
increasing safety stock. 
According to the minutes (item 4.2), extra socket clevis clamps were ordered but not needed 
and had to be booked back to Stores. Referring to the BOM, 1002 socket clevis clamps were 
ordered and only 202 were used. A total of 800 units costing R44 000 were tied up in stock 
for more than 2 years. 
5.9.1.2. The impact of fluctuation in materials and information flow on the bullwhip 
effect 
According to Niehaus et al, (2003:2), the value of information is often under-estimated. 
The scope of work was not quantified up front. The scope of work at Form 10 was vague: 
"Re-insulate approximately 80% of the line. Re-insulate 100% of the line". For a multi-
million rand project, especially one that supplies strategic customers such as Spoornet and 
Metrorail, a two-line scope is unacceptable. Incomplete information flow has passed through 
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the supply chain. At Form 15 stage, the vague scope (of Form 10) was acknowledged (Refer 
to Forml5 page 12 under cost variance explanation). However, a detailed scope of work was 
not done. The scope at Form 15 was based on a detailed inspection of 11 pylons. Clearly the 
sample chosen is not representative as it translates to a sample size of 11 of 225 or 4.8%. On 
a project of this magnitude and the fact that no two pylons are identical in terms of the 
refurbishment work, a detailed inspection should have been carried out up front to prevent 
variability in the project due to scope creep. This has a direct impact on cost and time 
variability. 
5.9.1.3. Lead times of information and materials 
Lead time of information and material lead times is reported to be one of the primary reasons 
for the bullwhip effect (Niehaus et al ,2003:5). 
There was no allowance for long-lead time materials on the Form 10 (Page 3 of the Form). 
The long-lead time material was then placed in the Form 15 (Page 3 of the Form). The value 
of the long lead time materials was R 2 986 500 for the earthwire and insulators. From the 
BOM, the materials cost as of 8 March 2006 were R5 603 981. 
According to the BOM (line 3), the earthwire insulators (with a lead time of at least 3 months) 
was ordered on three separate occasions under BOM revisions 8, 10 and 11. The order placed 
on 18 October 2005 for 200 insulators is still outstanding and is minuted under 4.1. 
5.9.1.4. Supplier selection and evaluation 
The choice of suppliers is critical to the success of the supply chain. According to Burt et al 
(2003:332), potential suppliers must be evaluated individually based on their capability in 
terms of capacity to deliver products on time according to the right quality and quantity. The 
ability to be flexible is also taken into consideration in the evaluation process. 
The delivery of accurate long-lead time materials is crucial to the success of a project. The 
supply of incorrect earthwire insulators is cause for concern (item 4.1 of the minutes). Three 
other projects were delayed due to late deliveries by the offending supplier. Other long lead 
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time items such as cables and conductors arrived on site in damaged drums and had to be 
returned to the supplier, (item 4.5 of the minutes). 
5.9.1.5. Batch Ordering 
The effort spent on waiting to fill large batches, is inefficient as it ties up capacity to produce 
goods that are not needed immediately. According to Saunders, M.(1997:210), the longer the 
lead times, the greater the capacity and time period held up in stock. 
Large batch ordering can be expensive. As indicated in the report by Eskom Construction 
(Appendix 2) , 225 tins of paint had to be re-ordered as the tins of paint were damaged in 
handling. The cost of the damaged paint was R180 000 (Refer to the BOM for costing). 
5.9.2. The relationship between the impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect 
and the impact of fluctuation in materials and information flow on the bullwhip 
effect 
Lee et al (1997:95) argue that companies wanting to control the bullwhip effect should focus 
on "modifying the chain's infrastructure and related processes rather than the decision 
makers' behaviour." Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the other hand, demonstrates that human 
behaviour does influence the efficiency of a supply chain. The reasons put forward on the 
impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect are in addition to other reasons influencing 
this phenomenon. (Niehaus et al, 2003:8). 
It is evident that human influence of defining a vague scope of work has in turn impacted on 
the project schedule and fluctuation of materials and information flow on the bullwhip effect. 
Batch ordering is through systems run by humans. According to Saunders, M.(1997:210), the 
longer the lead times, the greater the capacity and time period held up in stock. Thus projects 
are delayed by waiting to fill large batches. 
According to Burt et al (2003:332), potential suppliers must be evaluated individually based 
on their capability in terms of capacity to deliver products on time according to the right 
quality and quantity. The ability to be flexible is also taken into consideration in the 
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evaluation process. This is a direct human influence on the supply chain process (Burt et al 
2003:333). 
5.10. CONCLUSION 
Studies reported by Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the beer distribution game played online, with 
more than 400 participants, show how humans perform as co-makers in the supply chain. 
These co-makers display the behaviour of "panic" or safe-harbour" by ordering too little or 
too much stock. 
Lee et al (1997:95) argue that companies wanting to control the bullwhip effect should focus 
on "modifying the chain's infrastructure and related processes rather than the decision 
makers' behaviour." Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the other hand, demonstrates that human 
behaviour does influence the efficiency of a supply chain. 
The reasons put forward on the impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect are in 
addition to other reasons influencing this phenomenon (Niehaus et al, 2003:8). 
From the discussion on the findings in section 5.6. it was demonstrated that there is a 
relationship between the study on human behaviour and that of real-time projects. 
In section 5.9, it was demonstrated in the case study that there is a relationship between the 
impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect and the impact of fluctuation in materials 
and information flow on the bullwhip effect. 
It is a combination of both people and processes that attribute to the impact of the bullwhip 
effect. 
The next chapter provides the conclusion to this study. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Lee et al (1997:95) argue that companies wanting to control the bullwhip effect should focus 
on "modifying the chain's infrastructure and related processes rather than the decision 
makers' behaviour." Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the other hand, demonstrates that human 
behaviour does influence the efficiency of a supply chain. The reasons put forward on the 
impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect are in addition to other reasons influencing 
this phenomenon.(Niehaus et al ,2003:8). 
This chapter is structured in terms of the objectives of the study. 
6.1. The impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect 
Studies reported by Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the beer distribution game played online, with 
more than 400 participants, show how humans perform as co-makers in the supply chain. 
These co-makers display the behaviour of "panic" or safe-harbour" by ordering too little or 
too much stock. 
From the findings of Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that humans increase the bullwhip effect 
by ordering too much material thereby displaying "safe-harbour" behaviour. In the study of 
real-time projects, it was illustrated in Figure 5.5.1. that the total cost of the materials returned 
to New Germany Stores was approximately R1.6 million which is 2% of the total material 
project cost. A comparison with Figure 5.3.2. of the study on human behaviour had shown 
that 100% of respondents were in support of Statement 16: "It is better to over-order 
materials to ensure that at least the right quantity arrives on site ". Hence the results were 
consistent with the study on real-time projects. 
However when materials were scarce, then role-players tendered to order from several 
suppliers. In the study on real-time projects , it was shown in Figure 5.5.2 , that orders were 
placed with up to five different suppliers for the same scarce product. A comparison of Figure 
5.3.3 of the study on human behaviour of Statement 14, "When the supply of a type of 
material is scarce, then one may place orders with several suppliers" has shown that 93% of 
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respondents were in support of the statement. Hence the results are consistent with the study 
on real-time projects. 
The management implication of both types of behaviours are that in the "safe harbour" 
situation, there is the added cost of warehousing materials for anticipated use. Other 
problems is that of redundant materials. 
In the case study of Chapter 5, extra socket clevis clamps were ordered but not needed and 
had to be booked back to Stores. Referring to the BOM in Appendix 2, 1002 socket clevis 
clamps were ordered and only 202 were used. A total of 800 units costing R44 000 were tied 
up in stock for more than 2 years. 
6.2. The impact of fluctuation in materials and information flow on the bullwhip effect 
Lead time of information and material lead times is reported to be one of the primary reasons 
for the bullwhip effect (Niehaus et al ,2003:5). 
According to Niehaus et al ,(2003:2), the value of information is often under-estimated. 
Research conducted among operational managers from 200 companies has shown that the 
more important the information from customers is, the more frequently it is available to the 
company. However, it was discovered that operational managers would pass on the same 
information less frequently to their suppliers. By not passing on customer information to 
suppliers when it is available, the operational manager then becomes a hindrance to the flow 
of information throughout the supply chain, causing the bullwhip effect to be amplified by the 
increase in information lead times. 
The research findings based on statements 4, 5, 6 and 7 are relevant to the issue on lead times 
of information and material flow. The results of Statement 4: "Long lead time materials 
orders are placed on time as scheduled" were as follows: 4% of respondents strongly agreed 
and 4% agreed to the statement. However, 53% strongly disagreed while 39% disagreed to 
the statement. 
97 
Statement 5 "reducing material lead times will ensure timely completion of projects" is in 
line with the theory as mentioned earlier regarding the beer game simulation. Feedback from 
the survey regarding the afore-mentioned statement was as follows: 75% of respondents 
strongly agreed to statement 5 while 18% were in agreement to the statement. 7% of 
respondents were undecided. 
In Chapter 5, the total cost of the materials returned was approximately R1.6 million which is 
2% of the total material project cost. The funds could have been spent on more capital 
projects instead of been tied up in excess stock. 
In the case study of Chapter 5, the scope of work was not quantified up front. The scope of 
work at FormlO was vague: "Re-insulate approximately 80% of the line. Re-insulate 100% of 
the line". For a multi-million rand project , especially one that supplies strategic customers 
such as Spoornet and Metrorail, a two-line scope is unacceptable. Incomplete information 
flow has passed through the supply chain. At Form 15 stage, the vague scope (of Form 10) 
was acknowledged (Refer to Forml5 page 12 under cost variance explanation). However, a 
detailed scope of work was not done. The scope at Form 15 was based on a detailed 
inspection of 11 pylons. Clearly the sample chosen is not representative as it translates to a 
sample size of 11 of 225 or 4.8%. On a project of this magnitude and the fact that no two 
pylons are identical in terms of the refurbishment work, a detailed inspection should have 
been carried out up front to prevent variability in the project due to scope creep. This has a 
direct impact on cost and time variability. 
6.3. The relationship between the impact of human behaviour on the bullwhip effect 
and the impact of fluctuation in materials and information flow on the bullwhip 
effect 
According to Chen et al, (2000:437), efforts to quantify the bullwhip effect has led to two 
mathematical inequality models which quantify the impact of lead time on the bullwhip 
effect. The application of the model has shown that variance in orders increase additively in 
total lead time of a centralized supply chain. However, the variance in orders increases 
multiplicatively in a decentralized supply chain. 
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The conclusion derived by Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:90), is that by centralizing demand data, 
the bullwhip effect can be significantly reduced. 
In Chapter 5, the variance between the scheduled times of receiving materials to the actual 
time they are received on site, is illustrated by "F150-101" in Figure 7.3.2 (a). The total 
variance in the supply of materials is illustrated by "TotalVartime". The findings are 
consistent with Statement 7 of the previous chapter, where 100% of respondents have 
indicated that materials are not received timeously on site. 
In Chapter 5, the total cost of the materials returned was approximately R1.6 million which is 
2% of the total material project cost. The funds could have been spent on more capital 
projects instead of been tied up in excess stock. The results were consistent with the 
behaviour of supply-chain role-players over-ordering materials. 
In Chapter 5, there was no allowance for long-lead time materials on the Form 10 (Page 3 of 
the Form-Appendix 2). The long-lead time material was then placed in the Form 15 (Page 3 of 
the Form-Appendix 2). This was due to human error which led to project delays. 
The choice of suppliers is critical to the success of the supply chain. According to Burt et al 
(2003:332), potential suppliers must be evaluated individually based on their capability in 
terms of capacity to deliver products on time according to the right quality and quantity. The 
ability to be flexible is also taken into consideration in the evaluation process. 
In Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that there are no long term relationships with suppliers due 
to preference given to BEE companies as shown in Figure 7.4. (Eskom, 2004c: 1-21). In 
Chapter 5, the results obtained in Figure 7.4. are consistent with the findings of Statement 18, 
where 100%) of respondents agreed that BEE companies were given preference to supply 
materials. These companies will need to develop a good track record to prove their reliability 
as long-term suppliers. 
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6.4. Final Comments 
The argument expressed by Lee et al (1997:95) that companies wanting to control the 
bullwhip effect should focus on "modifying the chain's infrastructure and related processes 
rather than the decision makers' behaviour." while Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the other hand, 
demonstrates that human behaviour does influence the efficiency of a supply chain. 
It was demonstrated that there is a relationship between both studies and that it is both people 
and processes that need to be changed to achieve supply chain efficiency. 
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Chapter Seven: Recommendations 
The recommendations have been divided into those for a Generic Company, those for Eskom 
specifically and those for the case study and are structured under the main headers of 
mitigating the bullwhip effect. 
7.1 Recommendations for a Generic Company 
The bullwhip effect is a consequence of people and processes and can be mitigated or tamed 
by the following actions: 
7.1.1. Avoiding "Safe-Harbour" behaviour 
Studies reported by Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the beer distribution game played online, with 
more than 400 participants, show how humans perform as co-makers in the supply chain. 
These co-makers display the behaviour of "panic" or safe-harbour" by ordering too little or 
too much stock. 
Any role-player of the supply chain displaying this type of behaviour affects the functioning 
of the entire supply chain. When role-players order more than what is required, then safety 
stock increases. The costs of carrying inventory are substantial. For instance, special storage 
facilities are needed if the inventory is perishable or hazardous and has a limited shelf-life. 
Other inventory may require warehousing. Transport costs of the materials from the 
warehouse to where it is needed, are incurred. These costs are substantial. On average about 
5% of the materials cost is attributed to transportation of materials to site. The supply chain of 
the supplier is negatively impacted on as the supplier will employ more resources to meet the 
increased demand for his/her product (Eskom, 2003:10-25). 
Another factor to consider when carrying excess stock is that the stock may at some stage be 
rendered obsolete due to technology change or change in specifications and standards. There 
may be disposal costs to consider associated with obsolete stock (Young, 2005). 
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From the findings of Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that humans increase the bull whip effect 
by ordering too much materials thereby displaying "safe-harbour" behaviour. 
The recommendation is to order materials in the right quantity to arrive directly to where they 
are needed. Orders to suppliers should stipulate the safety stock and replenishment stock 
components as this assists the supplier in forecasting demand (Young, 2005). 
7.1.2. Avoiding "Panic" behaviour 
Role-players displaying "panic" behaviour order too little stock (Nienhaus et al (2003:7). 
According to Nienhaus et al (2003:7), this type of behaviour is the extreme opposite of the 
"safe" harbour behaviour but the consequences are similar. Role-players do not replenish 
stock which results in stock-outs as the safety stock has been used. The implications to the 
business are severe as the opportunity cost of not having the materials available on time, is 
high. 
Materials planning and forecasting should be implemented to avoid stock-outs. The company 
should make use of robust inventory tools such as MRP to improve inventory management. 
However, training of procurement officers and other system users must be initiated before the 
implementation of MRP software systems. (Lee et al, 1997:99). 
7.1.3 Reducing lead-times 
It has been demonstrated by Nienhaus et al (2003:7) , through the beer game simulation and 
independent studies through Eskom's supply chain, that the increase in lead times increases 
the bullwhip effect. The main components of lead-times are order-lead times, delivery lead-
times and information lead times. The main components of materials are long-lead time 
materials and short-lead time materials. The effects caused by an increase in lead-times for 
long-lead time materials are more severe than that of short-lead time materials. 
It is recommended that the focus should be more on reducing the lead-times of long-lead time 
materials than short-lead time ones. It was demonstrated in the studies on real time-projects 
that, on average, 50% of the materials consist of long-lead time materials. 
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Strategic partnerships with long-term accredited suppliers will ensure reliability in orders 
placed and the delivery of long-lead time materials. Delivery of materials should be 
coordinated to arrive directly to site to reduce delivery lead times and reduce warehousing 
costs. The use of innovation such as cross-docking, where supplier products arrive directly to 
the shop floor, can be used to reduce delivery lead times.(Burt et al, 2003:332). 
Information lead-time can be reduced by information sharing. Successful companies like 
IBM, HP and Apple insist on POS data from their retailers as part of their contract to assist 
the companies in forecasting demand. Innovations such as EDI can facilitate the sharing of 
information by supply chain partners (Lee et al, 1997:99). 
Another innovation that companies can implement is VMI (Lee et al, 1997:99). 
It is recommended that this innovation be implemented as the responsibility of ensuring that 
the correct inventory levels are maintained rests with the supplier. The advantages of the 
system are that stock-outs or excess stock is prevented. Furthermore, there is substantial 
savings from reduction of warehousing costs as the inventory is held by the supplier and 
delivered when needed. 
7.1.4. Sharine information through a centralized supply chain 
Information sharing is pivotal to the sustainability of the supply chain. In a centralized supply 
chain, the same customer demand information is shared at each stage of the supply chain to 
forecast demand. In a decentralized supply chain, each stage in the supply chain uses 
information from the previous stage as the customer demand information is not available to 
all role-players (Simchi-Levi et al, 2000:91). 
Companies must use a centralized supply chain to reduce variability. In this way the project 
demand data for each stage comes from the same base data. Furthermore, it is easier to keep 
all role-players updated as there is a single repository of information. 
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7.1.5. Prevention of multiple demand forecast updates 
The effect of the bullwhip is amplified when each stage of the supply chain forecasts demand 
using information from the previous stage. Furthermore the variability increases as each stage 
use a different technique to forecast demand. 
The solution is to make demand data centrally available, as has been discussed in section 9.4. 
Innovations such as VMI and CRP at the upstream stage of the supply chain control the re-
supply of inventory from upstream to downstream. Companies such as Campbell Soup, 
Nestle and Nabisco have successfully used CRP with successes in reducing inventory by up to 
25 percent. P&G uses VMI in the diaper industry, starting with its supplier 3M and ending 
with its customer, Walmart (Lee et al, 1997:99). 
For companies that use multi-echelon inventory systems, up-to-date information sharing from 
downstream to upstream is crucial to ensure accurate demand forecasts. A strategy to use is 
to ensure that the control of total inventory, both at upstream and downstream stages is 
optimized. 
Another solution to reducing the variability in demand forecasting is to supply direct to the 
customer and bypass the downstream stage of the supply chain. This strategy has been 
successfully implemented by companies like Dell and Apple Computers (Lee et al, 1997:99). 
7.1.6. Reducing order batches 
Supply chain variability increases when orders are not placed on time. As the costs of filling 
orders are high, some companies prefer to order in batches. For example, at P&G the cost to 
fill an order is between $35 to $75. Another reason for ordering in batches is to save on 
transport costs. However, the lead times are increased as orders are postponed until full 
truckloads are achieved (Lee et al, 1997:99). 
The solution is to reduce batch sizes and increase the frequency of re-supply. It is not 
economical to use full-truckloads as the order frequency is higher. Furthermore higher 
transportation costs are incurred due to the additional handling and administration. Another 
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problem is the damage of materials that may occur during handling operations, which causes 
further increase in lead time awaiting replacement of the damaged component. 
Another solution in reducing the bullwhip is by spreading the customers periodic order cycle 
evenly over time. For example P&G coordinate re-supply with their customers by frequent 
deliveries. The consequence is that the replenishment stocks to retailers are evenly spread. 
7.1.7. Stabilizing Prices 
Price promotions and discounts increase the variability in the supply chain. Customers 
engage in forward buying and buy more than what is needed. Manufacturers may also offer 
incentives to distributors and wholesalers which are passed onto the customer. Customers 
then buy in large quantities and stock for future demand (Lee et al, 1997:101). 
The solution is to reduce incentives for retailers by adopting a uniform wholesale pricing 
policy. Companies such as Pillsbury, P&G and Kraft have an "EDLP" policy to stabilize 
prices and prevent promotions and discounts. 
Companies must make use of the ABC systems to promote EDLP. The ABC system will 
expose the costs of inventory, warehousing, premium transportation and special handling that 
were previously hidden by conventional accounting systems. 
7.1.8. Prevention of Gaming in a shortage situation 
Suppliers allocate products according to the proportion of their sales records and not 
according to orders placed, during a product shortage situation. Large companies that 
implement this strategy are General Motors, Texas Instruments and Hewlett-Packard (Lee et 
al ,1997:101) . 
The solution is one of co-operation between the customer and the manufacturer. For example 
a steel galvanizing plant in Durban shuts down in October of each year. Customers who are 
aware of this will send their product in advance to prevent a spike in demand and 
consequently an increase in product lead times. 
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7.1.9. Good supplier selection and evaluation processes 
There is a distinction between low value and high value purchasing which is made by Burt et 
al (2003:332). For purchases of low value, evaluations can be made from the website or 
brochures. For high value purchases, the procedures are more complex. Site visits are 
conducted to plants to evaluate quality, capacity and service. 
The solution is to set an evaluation process based on a set of criteria with ratings and 
weightings. The assessment must be objective and quantifiable. Suppliers should be 
evaluated on performance rather than price. As Preis (2003:36) points out, the evaluation 
process and rating system must be objective by choosing criteria such as price, performance 
and quality rather than just interpersonal satisfaction to ensure an effective evaluation. 
7.1.10 Formation of strategic partnerships and supplier integration 
According to Simchi-Levi et al, (2000:9l),the bullwhip effect is reduced by the constructive 
use of strategic partnerships. Techniques already discussed in the previous sections may be 
used. These are VMI and centralized demand information. For example, in VMI , the 
manufacturer is not dependant on the retailer's orders and consequently eliminates the 
bullwhip as the management of the inventory at the retailer stage is the responsibility of the 
manufacturer. 
7.2. Recommendations for Eskom 
The recommendations for the Generic Company are also applicable to Eskom. These are 
additional recommendations emanating from the research. 
7.2.1. Avoiding "Safe-Harbour" behaviour 
Role-players displaying "panic" behaviour order too little stock (Nienhaus et al (2003:7). 
Supply chain role-players must avoid ordering materials in excess of what is required. If the 
project scope was done systematically, then there should be no variance in material demand. 
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Eliminate storage of project materials at New Germany as it encourages poor supply chain 
practice by hiding the inefficiencies due to the acceptance of redundant materials from site. 
Furthermore, valuable warehouse space is used for redundant and obsolete stock that is 
adding no value to the business. (Young, 2005). 
7.2.2. Avoiding "Panic" behaviour 
Role-players displaying "panic" behaviour order too little stock (Nienhaus et al (2003:7). 
Role-players who have experienced this are known to display "safe-harbour" strategies the 
next time orders are placed. Careful project planning and ensuring that all long lead time 
materials are placed at Form 10, will eliminate stock-outs. Safety stock, as the name suggests, 
is for an emergency and not to be used as part of a routine project. Role-players have the 
tendency of accepting reworked or redundant materials from previous batches to alleviate the 
problem.(Rajkarran, 2006). However, mixing and matching components is unacceptable as it 
does not support a uniform maintenance strategy for the same asset. Furthermore, the life-
cycle of the asset is compromised by accepting materials that are sub-standard. 
7.2.3. Reducing lead-times 
The research findings based on statements 4, 5, 6 and 7 are relevant to the issue on lead times 
of information and material flow. The results of Statement 4: "Long lead time materials 
orders are placed on time as scheduled" were as follows: 4% of respondents strongly agreed 
and 4% agreed to the statement. However, 53% strongly disagreed while 39% disagreed to 
the statement. 
The research findings based on Statement 5 "reducing material lead times will ensure timely 
completion of projects " is in line with the theory as mentioned earlier regarding the beer 
game simulation. Feedback from the survey regarding the afore-mentioned statement was as 
follows: 75% of respondents strongly agreed to statement 5 while 18% were in agreement to 
the statement. 7% of respondents were undecided. 
The employment of specialist procurement officers for the sourcing of long-lead time 
materials should be in place. As shown in the studies 50% of a project consists of long-lead 
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time materials. Emphasis should be placed on long-lead time. For external contractor 
projects, place the onus on the contractor to supply the short-lead time items. This will enable 
procurement officers to assist specialist procurement officers in reducing the lead times of 
long-lead time materials. (Ferns, 2005). 
Rotran should not be used to transport materials because the company is a subsidiary of 
Eskom. The premium is on average about 30% more than other competitors. This would 
translate to a savings per project of about R39 000. (Young, 2005). 
All materials should be sent to site where they are needed. This will eliminate the double-
handling of materials and prevent storage at New Germany (Ferns, 2005). 
The stores at New Germany should be for the storage of strategic stock for emergency 
preparedness only. The composition of the strategic stock to include cables, wood-poles for 
use in temporary power-line deviations, insulators and transformers with multi-voltage 
transformation such as 132kV/88kV/33kV/llkV, that is a transformer capable of stepping 
down the voltage from 132kV or 88kV to 33kV or 1 lkV. Fewer transformers need to be kept 
in stock due to this flexibility. 
7.2.4. Sharing information through a centralized supply chain 
Project Coordinators (PC's) must be proactive in ensuring that project information is accurate 
and updated. The PC must ensure that all role-players are kept in the loop and have access to 
centralized project information through regular project meetings. Projects that are fast-
tracked must be given a higher priority over other projects due to their tight deadlines. 
All supply chain role-players must be included in the preparation of quotations for customers. 
This will avoid inaccurate quotes as the information available is complete and fairly accurate. 
The time-frames for customer quotes must be adhered to by both parties. 
7.2.5. Prevention of multiple demand forecast updates 
Currently there are three different project schedules for the same projects. These schedules 
have been drawn up by the Network Services Manager with the primary objective of 
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optimizing cash flows, independent of resource constraints and customer need dates. The 
Project Engineering Manager has set up demand schedules (updated every 6 months) with his 
staff to distribute the work load equitably, independent of the priority list. The Project 
Manager has demand schedules (updated every 2 weeks) without liaising with the Network 
Services Manager or the Project Engineering Manager, (Eskom, 2003:11-12). 
7.2.6. Reducing order batches 
Materials such as paint must be delivered directly to site in batches according to usage so as to 
preserve shelf life of the product. Batch materials in smaller quantities to avoid damage which 
can prove to be costly. The extent of the problem was highlighted in the case study. 
The "full-truckload" trap should be avoided. The savings from using a full-truckload to 
transport materials is eroded by the expense of lengthening lead-times and damage of 
materials due to handling and storage. 
7.2.7. Stabilizing Prices 
Suppliers of paint and power-line hardware, offer a tiered discount structure linked to the 
number of items purchased. Hence the larger the volume purchased, the greater is the 
discount. Procurement officers delay projects that have the same items in an effort to obtain a 
large batch to take advantage of the discount structures. 
Promotions and discounts offered by material suppliers should be avoided as the cost of 
delaying a project is greater than the discounts offered 
7.2.8. Prevention of Gaming in a shortage situation 
Customer reaction to rationing may lead to inflated orders to the manufacturer, in view of the 
anticipated short supply. However, when the demand reduces, customers may cancel orders, 
hence "game" the rationing. Lee et al (1997:97) are of the view that customer orders in this 
instance, give scarce data to the supplier. An example cited by Lee et al (1997:98), is the 
perceived shortage of computer chips. Customers placed duplicate orders with multiple 
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suppliers and purchased only from the supplier that delivered the product first. The other 
orders were subsequently cancelled. 
Inflating orders of scarce materials with several suppliers should be avoided in an attempt to 
get the correct quantity and then cancel the remaining orders as this practice leads to the 
bullwhip effect in the supply chain of the suppliers. 
7.2.9. Good supplier selection and evaluation processes 
The evaluation process may be based on a set of selection criteria and corresponding rating 
based on its weighting. According to Burt et al (2003:336), an assessment is based on the 
numerical ratings as well as site investigations. As Preis (2003:36) points out, that the 
evaluation process and rating system must be objective by choosing criteria such as price, 
performance and quality rather than just interpersonal satisfaction to ensure an effective 
evaluation. 
An analysis of projects awarded to the lowest tender has shown that the successful tenderer 
makes money not from the contract but from variations to the contract. Variations are in the 
form of consequential non-performance of work due to inclement weather, or scope creep. 
Materials suppliers must be evaluated objectively and awarded contracts based on their 
historical performance and cost Preis (2003:36). Quality issues must be addressed at the 
source, rather than the project site where it is too late to remedy the situation. 
The Non-conformance process must be utilized as a mechanism to sustain good supplier 
behaviour. According to regional stance on this issue, if a supplier has three non-
conformance reports for the same project, he or she is then removed from the vendor list. As 
this process involves reams of paperwork, role-players are reluctant to fill the reports. 
Furthermore, once the report is filled in, there is a follow-up procedure to rectify the problem. 
It is difficult to discipline the offending suppliers without the necessary paperwork in place. 
Suppliers must be charged for consequential costs of delays. For instance, if the construction 
crew is standing at R10 000 per day as a result of late deliveries, then the supplier must be 
charged for the standing time (Ferns,2005). 
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7.2.10. Formation of strategic partnerships and supplier integration 
There are no long term relationships with suppliers due to preference given to BEE companies 
as shown in Figure 7.4. (Eskom, 2004c:l-21). 
There must be a long term partnership with few suppliers. Long term suppliers develop an 
understanding of the company's policies and work towards a common objective. 
One of Eskom's core values is "Customer Satisfaction". Strategic partnerships will enable 
long term suppliers to be flexible to customer demands so that customer expectations can be 
met. 
7.3. Recommendations for Georgedale Northdene-Lotus park project (Case Study) 
Effective supply chain co-ordination be implemented to minimize variability and eliminate 
bottlenecks in the supply chain. 
Detailed investigations be carried out for the remaining project to quantify materials 
requirements. 
The choice of suppliers is critical to the success of the supply chain. According to Burt et al 
(2003:332), potential suppliers must be evaluated individually based on their capability in 
terms of capacity to deliver products on time according to the right quality and quantity. The 
ability to be flexible is also taken into consideration in the evaluation process. 
Implement an effective supplier selection and evaluation policy. Black-list the supplier of 
incorrect earthwire insulators and late delivery of strategic materials. Charge suppliers for 
opportunity costs as a consequence of project delays from incorrect materials and late 
deliveries. 
The effort spent on waiting to fill large batches, is inefficient as it ties up capacity to produce 
goods that are not needed immediately. According to Saunders, M.(1997:210), the longer the 
lead times, the greater the capacity and time period held up in stock. 
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7.4. Way forward for Eskom 
Eskom needs to change as a region and company as a whole to stay competitive. In order to 
sustain its role as a leading electricity producer of global stature, the company must 
implement the following changes to realize its vision of maintaining sustainable growth and 
development. 
7.4.1. Policy of zero tolerance 
All supply-chain role-players must be held accountable for their decisions by having a policy 
of not tolerating any fruitless and wasteful expenditure due to role-players' behaviour of 
ordering more than what is needed or alternatively not placing orders in time. Key 
Performance Indicators pertaining to inventory management must be incorporated into the job 
compacts of role-players. This instrument can be measured objectively and would ultimately 
influence the performance (and bonuses) of role-players. 
7.4.2. Improving on long-lead time deliverables 
There is a need to reduce the lead-times of long lead- time materials to facilitate deliverables 
to customers. The company can employ specialist procurement officers to focus specifically 
on long lead time materials.(Eskom,2003:l 1). 
A supplier forum needs to be initiated as a platform for suppliers to discuss new technologies. 
The opportunity should be used to network and improve supply chain efficiency. 
Avoid patronizing Eskom subsidiaries such as Rotran. These subsidiaries charge premium 
fees of 30% above the industry average. By coordinating the delivery of long lead time 
materials from the supplier directly to site, there is no need for transportation. 
7.4.3. Sharing information through a centralized supply chain 
There should be a central repository for storage of information. The company has a data 
system called "Projectwise" that is shared with the engineers and surveyors. It is populated 
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with project design data from project inception to completion. The database should be 
extended to include all aspects of the project incorporating data from all role-players. For 
instance, customer demand data should be a part of the database. The database should be 
made available to all supply-chain role-players and updated weekly by a single administrator 
(Pieterse, 2005). 
7.4.4. Forecasting customer demand 
There is currently a divide between the technical and marketing entities of the business. As a 
company, resources need to be optimally utilized to meet or exceed customer expectations. 
This barrier must be removed to align individuals with company objectives. More effort is 
needed to promote an all inclusive cross-functional team that is empowered to liaise with the 
customer. 
Where practically possible, having the customer as part of the team is a strategy worth 
exploring. In this way, accurate updated customer demand data is available for forecasting 
future demand. 
7.4.5. Transformation of the warehousing function in New Germany 
The warehousing function in New Germany must be changed to house only strategic stock 
and emergency spares. The rest of the warehouse could be converted to much-needed training 
facilities for the training of technical staff. This facility was located at the warehouse in 
Pietermaritzburg but has since been destroyed by fire. 
7.4.6. No thanks to discounts and promotions 
One of the ways of reducing the bullwhip effect caused by forward buying is to reduce both 
the frequency and level of wholesale price discounting (Lee et al, 1997:101). A solution 
proposed by Lee et al (1997:101), is to reduce incentives for retailers by adopting a uniform 
wholesale pricing policy. 
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The company should avoid any discount and promotion structures offered by material 
suppliers as it causes unnecessary spikes in the supply chain by forward buying. These 
supplier policies are not sustainable. 
7.4.7. Prevention of Gaming in a shortage situation 
Having the policy of zero tolerance in place should prevent this detrimental practice. 
Furthermore, the gaming is not aligned with the best practice principles of procurement. The 
company needs to protect its goodwill and branding by following best practice principles. 
7.4.8. Implement a new purchasing pact with suppliers 
According to Tucker (2005), no company should be competing on price alone but rather by 
the value it is offering. 
The existing pact with suppliers, Directive ESKADAAX7 revision 2 refers to supplier 
selection based on the lowest tenderer (Eskom, 2004c: 1-21). The policy document must be 
changed to reflect the vision and objectives of the company. The current vision is based on 
sustainability and suppliers must be aligned to this vision. There needs to be long term 
partnerships with suppliers to promote sustainable growth and development. 
Lee et al (1997:95) argue that companies wanting to control the bullwhip effect should focus 
on "modifying the chain's infrastructure and related processes rather than the decision 
makers' behaviour." Nienhaus et al (2003:7) on the other hand, demonstrates that human 
behaviour does influence the efficiency of a supply chain. 
It was demonstrated in the studies that there is a relationship between the impact of human 
behaviour on the bullwhip effect and the impact of fluctuation in materials and information 
flow on the bullwhip effect. Companies seeking competitive advantage need to mitigate with 
regards to both the human impact and the process impact to achieve supply chain efficiency. 
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Chapter Eight: Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
8.1. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The research was based on the Eastern Region in Eskom Distribution Division. There are 5 
other regions in the country and two additional divisions (namely Generation and 
Transmission) within Eskom Holdings which may be investigated in terms of this study. 
Furthermore the supply chain of suppliers may be investigated in relation to the Eskom supply 
chain. 
8.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research needs to determine the extent of the bullwhip effect in 5 other regions in the 
country and two additional divisions (namely Generation and Transmission) within Eskom 
Holdings. 
The research can be extended to include the supply chain of suppliers and implement ways of 
improving operational efficiencies within the suppliers' supply chain. 
A benchmarking exercise can be initiated to compare Eskom's supply chain with world class 
supply chain entities. 
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APPENDIX 1 -SAMPLE OF RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dear Participant 
This survey is for research purposes only in fulfilling the requirements of the MBA degree. 
All information supplied will be treated as confidential. 









1 There are too many project schedules for the same project 
2 Project information is not centrally available and shared by all parties 
3 Fast -tracked projects are given priority in material orders placed 
4 Lonq lead time materials orders are placed on time as scheduled 
5 Reducinq material lead times will ensure timely completion of projects 
6 It is preferable to supply materials direct to site than warehouse in New Germany 
7 Materials are received timeously on site. 
8 Orderinq materials in batches such as concrete and paint saves on transportation 
9 It is cheaper to order materials in batches as one can make use of discount structures 
10 The information available at Form 10 stage is sufficient to do a feasibility quote 
11 Customers have sufficient time to respond to the feasibility quote 
12 The information available at Form 15 staqe is adequate to do a budqet quote 
13 Customers have sufficient time to respond to the budqet quote 
14 When the supply of a type of material is scarce, then one may place orders with several suppliers 
15 It is easy to place and then cancel orders with suppliers 
16 It is better to over-order materials to ensure that at least the riqht quantity arrives to site 
17 Materials not used are easy to qet rid off by returning the materials to stores 
18 Durinq Form 150 staqe, BEE companies are given preference to supply materials 
19 Suppliers are chosen based on the lowest tendered price 
20 The choice of material suppliers can determine the success of a project 
21 Supplier selection and evaluation is done objectively and openly 
22 All project roleplayers have an opportunity to evaluate suppliers 
23 Material quality is often compromised resultinq in rework on site 
24 Project delays are attributed to poor quality of materials supplied 
25 Project delays are attributed to materials arrivinq late to site 
26 Project delays are attributed to incorrect materials arriving to site 
27 Project delays are attributed to incorrect batchinq of materials to site 
28 There are no penalties imposed on suppliers for causinq project delays 
29 There are no lonq term partnerships with qood suppliers 
30 Once a project is commissioned, projects are evaluated objectively 
Comments 
Thank You for participating in this survey 
Kind Regards 
Dan Dukhan 
Appendix 2: Project Data Reference 
• PROJECT MINUTES 
• PROJECT FORMS 
• BILL OF MATERIALS 
• REPORT BY CONSTRUCTION ON MATERIALS HANDLING AND 
STORAGE 
GEORGEDALE-NORTHDENE-LOTUS PARK LINE 
REFURBISHMENT 
M E E T I N G NO 13 
VENUE: Cato Ridge TSC 
DATE: 14/02/2006 
JOB No WKL2GN/WKS2GG 
Project Coordinator - Chris Gxumisa 
Project Engineer - Dan Dukhan 
Survey - Futhi Ndwandwe 
Internal Construction - Willy Bull 
TSC Cato Ridge - Mandla Mpanza 
Clerk of Works - Eddie Rencken 
PRESENT : H S Strydom, C Ferns, M Mpanza, D Dukhan, T Nekhalale, A Ndlovu, 
C Nkwanyana. 
APOLOGIES/ABSENT : G Gxumisa, W Bull. 
ABSENT : E Rencken, S Mbuyazi, F Ndwandwe, B Cooper. 
OUTAGES: To be arranged through the Commissioning Co-ordinator . 
MINUTES ACCEPTED (CONTRACTOR) 
(PROJECT MANAGER) 
FORM 150 : AGREED & SIGNED SIGNATORY: DATE . 
OPENING ACTION 
The PC opened the meeting at 09:20. 
1. PROJECT SCOPE 
1.1 Georgedale Lotus Park 88kV Line Refurbishment 
Paint 225 towers on line 1 including tees. Relabel 225 towers . Restring 69km 
of earthwire. Repace 1715 insulators and all associated hardware.Clearing the 
servitude of trees and shrubs 
1.2 Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Paint 225 towers on line 2 including tees. Relabel 225 towers. Restring 69km 
of earthwire. Replace 1715 insulators and all associated hardware. Clear the 
servitude of trees and shrubs. 
2. PROJECT COMMUNICATION 
2.1 Communication on this project will be via telephone, fax, verbal, site meetings 




4.1 Earth wire insulators in Stores are incorrect, and now have a serious effect on 
the project. It was pointed out to Logistics during October 2005. Logistics to 
urgently resolve the matter. 
4.2 Socket clevis ordered for the project, were not all needed, and MEW to return 
the balance of approximately 800 to Stores. 
4.3 PE and MEW Site Supervisor visited Stores and found many damaged tins of 
paint. Logistics to replace these tins, as they cannot be issued to site. 
4.4 PE to revise the BOM to include additional paint required for the project. All 
future paint deliveries to be arranged on a "as and when required" basis. This 
may limit wastage as paint has a shelve life. It also creates a storage 
problem. Procurement to take note. 
4.5 The issue of damaged cable/conductor drums delivered to site has been 
taken up with the Regional Warehousing Manager, and he requested that 
MEW do not accept any damaged drums on site. 
5. PROJECT PACKAGE UPDATES 
5.1 BOM to be revised to include additional paint required. 
6. PROJECT QUALITY 









6.1 QUALITY INSPECTIONS / DEFECTS 
6.1.1 There seems to be no quality document in place for the project. MEW and 
CoW to rectify urgently. 
6.1.2 There seems to be confusion as to where the 500mm below ground level 
starts when the tower legs are painted. PE informed the meeting that the 
500mm will start at the existing ground level, and not the original (natural) 
ground level as understood by the CoW. Where the tower is on an 
embankment, and becomes a safety issue, then a retaining wall should be 
installed. CoW to issue a list of these towers to the PE. It will then be decided 
if these retaining walls will be included in this project, or treated as a separate 
project. 
6.1.3 CoW to issue a report highlighting all quality problems. 
6.1.4 The concrete pole at structure 285 Lotus Park line, which was possibly 
cracked when the new cross arm was installed, needs to be repaired. PE 
issued the following procedure to be followed when repairing pole. 
1. Create a 20mm deep longitudinal groove on all 4 sides of the pole. 
The groove must be 150mm from either side of the crack , ie, the 
total groove length must be 300mm. 
2. Clean out the grooves and crack and apply PROSTRUCT epoxy to 
grooves and crack. 
3. Install Y10 rebar (300mm in length) into the grooves. 
4. After 24 hours , apply Sika repair mortar to the cracks and grooves in 
the pole. 







The structure can then be painted as per instruction in scope of work 
"Appendix Two : Procedure for the repair of spalling concrete. 
SAFETY 
2.1 SITE SAFETY REP. 
2.2 No of medical incidents/accidents 
2.3 No of disabling/fatal ACCIDENTS 
2.4 Incidents/accidents-
2.5 Near hit incidents 
Cliff Ferns 




2.6 Loss incidents 
One staff member of MEW, who was not deem fit for work by the 
Construction Official, ignored the CO's instruction not to work, climb tower 
269, and fell approximately 9m to the ground. The case is under investigation. 
3 SAFETY ISSUES 
3.1 Retaining walls needed at some of the towers. CoW to issue report, Eddie Rencken 
highlighting all these towers. 
3.2 Trenches dug at various towers, for water run off, are seen as a safety Ted Barnard 
hazard. Risk Management to investigate and recommend corrective action. 
3.3 At tower 100/5, an embankment was created to allow access to the tower Ted Barnard 
foundations. This has now become a safety hazard, as an existing toilet door 
is approximately one metre from the embankment, which can cause people 
using the toilet, to fall down the embankment. The embankment is 
approximately 1,2m high. Risk Management to investigate, and recommend 
corrective action. 
3.4 MEW to inform the Construction team, that all instructions to deviate from the Cliff Ferns 
original scope of work are to be issued by the Project Engineer. Dan Dukhan 
PROJECT RISKS 
Rain, as it is a rainy season 
Access to properties 
Highway crossings 
Crime in some areas 
Environmental issues 
Access due to urbanisation / squatting - this needs to be addressed 
urgently with Land Development as it poses a huge a risk to the 
completion of the project. 
Dan pointed out the risk of mechanical insulator failure was high and 
there is a risk of conductor parting across the N3 freeway, railway 
crossings and other strategic spots. 
Span between twr 221 and twr 222 running above the 400kV line risks in 
getting a Tx outage, PC to establish if it can be done live. 
No access between twr 243 and 246 cause of squatters. Futhi to 
investigate. 
Spans between twr 247 and twr 249 cross over railway lines. PC to 
establish if it can be done live or get an outage from metrorail. 
Access to string tower to beam inside Umlazi traction, PC to check if it 
can be done live or an outage to be arranged. 
Span between twrs 221 and 222 cannot be done live, customer execs to 
investigate the possibilities of getting an outage on the 275kV which runs 
underneath belonging to DBN metro. KSACS please treat this as an 
extreme emergency. 
Outages. 
Metrorail's refusal of giving outage to Northdene. 
8. CONSTRUCTION PLAN 
8.1 Construction plan to be forwarded to PC by Friday 17/02/2006. Cliff Ferns 
9. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH and SAFETY ACT REGULATIONS 
9.1 MEW to comply. Willy Bull 
10. PROJECT DURATION 
10.1 OVERALL PROGRESS : 54% 
10.2 TIME BASE LINE 
Planned start date : 01 Sept 04 
Actual start date: 01/09/2004 
Planned completion date: March 05 
Anticipated completion date: Dec 05 
10.3 Expenditure: Expenditure on the projects has been discussed, and the PC 
pointed out to the Team that the project is only 54% complete, but overspent. 
PC and MEW Contracts Superintendent to investigate over expenditure, and 
PC to revise the Form 150. Some of the main reasons for over expenditure 
are as follows. 
1. At the time of the Form 150, no detailed line inspection done, which 
resulted in additional work and material. 
2. No provision for bush clearing. 
3. No provision made for correction of tower labels, and to remove 
labels again when painting in progress. 
4. Lost time due to awaiting outage. 
5. Increased resources cost, ie labour and material 
11. SITE INSTRUCTIONS/VARIATION ORDERS 
11.1 Nil. 
12. PROJECT RESOURCES 
12.1 SITE PERSONNEL 
Site Supervisor: Cliff Ferns 
Skilled workers 10 
Semi-skilled workers 61 
12.2 PLANT ON SITE 
Trucks 6 
LDV vehicles 3 
Toyota condor 1 
13. LAND DEVELOPMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL 
13.1 There are some towers where land owners fenced off underneath towers, Tshililo Nekhalale 
another one where a wall is built under the tower, etc. Land Development to Eddie Rencken 
investigate, as MEW cannot get access to these towers. A list of these 
instances to be made available to Land Development Department. 
13.2 Eskom Environmental Department to visit site and recommend necessary Tshililo Nekhalale 
action where needed. 
14. LABELLING 
14.1 MEW to confirm that all labels are on site. All labels short, to be reported to Cliff Ferns 
the PC. PE to ensure that all labels are on the label schedule, and forwarded Dan Dukhan 
to TSG Label Section. 
14.2 MEW to ensure that all labels, taken off when painting is done, to be tied back Cliff Ferns 
properly. 
15. TSG/MKONDENI WORKSHOPS 
15.1 MEW to negotiate with TSG Live Line when their services are required. PC to Cliff Ferns 
be informed of times and cost, as the Form 150 is to be revised. Anderson Ndlovu 
Chris Gxumisa 
16. TURN IN LINES 
16.1 Nil. 
17. OUTAGE ARRANGEMENTS 
17.1 OUTAGE DATE 
17.1.1 MEW, TSC and C o W to issue outage plan, and confirm dates. Cliff Ferns 
Mandia Mpanza 
Eddie Rencken 
17.2 COMMISSIONING DATE/PROCEDURE 
17.2.1 To be drawn up by Cato Ridge TSC. Mandia Mpanza 
17.3 COMMISSIONING CO-ORDINATOR 
17.3.1 The Commissioning Co-ordinator on the project is Mandia Mpanza, from Cato Mandia Mpanza 
Ridge TSC. 
17.4 ISSUING of DD's 
17.4.1 PE to ensure that all DD's are correct, and submitted to Mkondeni Control. Dan Dukhan 
18. GENERAL 
18.1 Compensation report to be drawn up, and Form 150 to be revised once Hennie Strydom 
compensation events are agreed upon. Willy Bull 
18.2 The following sections on the project have not been done/completed due to 
no outages. Outages are required to change earth wire, hard ware, steel work, 
and to paint the tops of the towers. 
> Umlazi to Reunion Traction Station 
> Umlazi to Crossmoor 
> Cavendish T lines 
> Assegay T lines 
> Delville Wood T lines 
> Cliffdale T lines 
> Marian Hill T lines 
> Georgedale T lines 
> DassenhoekT lines 
> Northdale T lines 
18.3 The Project Team recommended that more traing to be given to staff doing Brad Cooper 
line patrols, as it appears that items such as earth tests and inspection of 
tower foundations are not done. TSC to follow up. 
18.4 Construction to make the final completion date of the project available to Cliff Ferns 
Customer Services. Celo Nkwanyana 
18.5 There seems to uncertainty as to when the project will be completed. MEW Willy Bull 
Contracts Superintendent to confirm completion date. 
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PROJECT DETAIL FORM 10 PAGE 3 
Asset Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Project ID N010236 
LONG US AS TIME MATERIAL APPROVES I 
Item Description Lead Time (Mths) Quantity Amount ( Rands ) % 
Tot. Long Lead Time Material Approved R 
NEW MATERIAL COSTS (CUSTOMER PROJECT) 
RE-USED MATERIAL COST (DEPRECIATED) 
PROJECT PHYSICAL STATISTICS 
BuKd/ Install I Refurbish Km's HV Km's MV Km'sLV Comments 
Line 33.0 
Cable 
Dismantle / Remove Kitt's HV Kra'sMV Kfn'sLV Comments 
Line 
Cable 
Build /Install/Refurbish Quantity Total MVA Comments 
Transformers 
Oismantte / Recover Quantity Total MVA 
Transformers 
Customer Connections Quantity 'SijiJsT^iic'o^sSi:--^ Cost? Conn. Comments 
Electrification Connections R 8DIV/0! 
Minor Works Customer Connections R #DIV/0l 
BUSINESS PLAN KPl'S KPI THIS PROJECT TARGET KPI ^:JmM-[:^\ COMMENTS 
Cost per Transformer #DIW0l R / Unit 
Cost per MVA (Subtransmission only) #DIV/0! R/MVA 
Cost per Kilometer (Subtransmission only) R 33,638 R/Km 
MVA per Transformer #DIV/0! MVA / Unit 
MVA per Kilometer (Retic & Electrification ) #DIV/0i MVA/Km 
Transformers per Kilometer (Retic & Elec ) #DlV/0! No/Km 
Connections per Kilometer (Retic & Elec) SDIV/0! No/Km 
RESOURCES I 
Project Manager / Consultant 
Project Engineer Primary 
Project Engineer Control Plant 





Asset Dismantled Description Asset number / Year Cost Ace Depreciation Book Value 
FORM 15 PROJECT APPROVAL Standard 
PROJECT DETAILS 
Asset Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Parent Project Name 
Project ID N010236 Form Registration Date 15-May-2002 
Project Initiator Name Manogaran Chetty Form Registered By Vlanogaran Chetty 
Engineering Region Eastern Initiator Tel No +27 31 7105057 
Technical Service Area Cato Ridge Distribution Customer Load Network 
Customer Service Area Pietermaritzburg Network Development Plan / F1 Area Hammars/ Elangeni 
Field Service Area Pietermaritzburg Project Latitude Coordinate 
Magisterial District/ Municipality Project Longitude Coordinate 
BUSINESS CATEGORY/PROGRAMMES 
Refurbishment 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION & MOTIVATION 
Executive Summary / Motivation 
Gerogedale Northdene 88kV Line 2 was investigated as part of the Hammersdale NDP. The physical condition, and performance of the 
Georgedale Lines has triggered the refurbishment scope below. 
Scope of Work Description 
Paint 225 towers on line 2 including tees. Relabel 225 towers. Restring 69km of earthwire. Replace 1715 insulators and all associated 
hardware. Clear the servitude of trees and shrubs. 
Relevant Reference Documents 
Refer to Planning Department's Hammersdale NDP Report. 
Available in Teammate. 
Project Family Details 
Interdependent Asset Names Project ID Form 10 Value 
Georgedale Northdene 88kV line 1 refubishment N010234 R 9,032,998 
Total Parent Project Value R 1,110,041 
PROJECT ECONOMIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Economic Classific. Strategic 
Optimistic MIRR ( % ) Pessimistic MIRR ( % ) 
Optimistic NPV ( R ) R Pessimistic NPV (R ) R 
Optimistic ERR ( % ) Pessimistic ERR (% ) 
PROJECT DATES 
Project Required Completion Date 25-Feb-2004 Budget Year 2004 
TOTAL C O S T ESTIMATES PER REPORTING CATEGORY 
JOB CATEGORY Sub-Transmission Lines (66-132 kV) Year (Rands) 
TOTAL PROJECT CAPITAL COST R 9,067,062 97% 
TOTAL DISMANTLE COST R 248,904 3% 
CONTRIBUTION FUNDING R 7,716,572 83% 
TOTAL PROJECT COST (VALUE A) (Capital + Supply) R 9,315,966 100% 
TOTAL ASSET VALUE (VALUE B) R 1,350,490 14% 
TOTAL CAPITAL CASH FLOW REQUIRED (VALUE C) R 1,350,490 14% 
CUSTOMER QUOTATION VALUE (VALUE D) 
PROJECT DETAILS FORM 15 PAGE 2 
: \ • ; • • : " • : . • : 
Asset Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Project ID N010236 WBS ROOT ELEMENT WKL2G2/WKL2G3 
PROJECT COSTS (CAPITAL ONLY) 
Job Category Amount ( Rands ) % 
Total Pre-Eng Costs (from F10) R 40,000 0.4% 
Additional Pre-Eng Costs R 368,153 4.0% 
Total Engineering Costs at F15 stage R 408,153 4.4% 
Materials (new, re-used & transport) R 5,656,030 60.7% 
Contracts R 2,147,808 23.1% 
Internal Construction R 
Other Internal Labour R 75,000 0.8% 
Less: Dismantle Costs (If Total Dismantle Job) R 
Sub-Total Direct Costs R 8,286,991 89.0% 
Overheads R 497,219 5.3% 
IDC R 282,852 3.0% 
Total Project Capital Cost(F15) R 9,067,062 97.3% 
F10 (or last approved form 15)Cost R 1,110,041 n/a 
Variance R (7,957,021) -716.82% 
Cost Variance Explanation 
Scope of work for F10 vague and incomplete 
DISMANTLE < R20.000 No 
DISMANTLE COSTS R 248,904 CONTRIBUTION FUNDING R 7,716,572 
CURRENT OVERHEAD % 6.0% CURRENT IDC % 3.22% 
PROJECT SCHEDULE 
Estimated F150 Completion Date 04-Aug-2003 CONSTRUCTION START DATE 01-Sep-2003 
( a ) Estimated Project Completion Date (Resource Scheduling - PM) 30-Jun-2004 
( b ) Project Committed Completion Date (Base line in Scheduling System) 25-Feb-2004 
Schedule Variance Explanation -126 
Increased scope requires longer duration. 
Environmental Status No Environmental Impact 
PROJECT ACCEPTANCE {Relevant to Project) 
Role Name Tel. No. Signature Date 
Project Engineering Manager P van Heeswijk 3769 PvH 04-Jul-2003 
Project Manager AVBall 8311 3657 AVB 15-Jul-2003 
Project Accountant 
Network Planning Manager for EL Bunge 8311 3692 MD Pallett 03-Jul-2003 
EDNS Manager 
Land Development Manager NW Purdon 8321-5483 NWP 03-Jul-2003 
CIC APPROVAL FOR F15 EXPENDITURE R 3,394,653 37% 
CIC Meeting Date 21-Jul-20Q3 CIC Meeting No. 270 
CIC Comments 
Approved 
CIC Signatory D Conradie 21-Jul-03 
PROJECT DETAILS EORMiSPAOES 
Asset Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Project ID N010236 
LONG LEAD TIME MATERIAL APPROVED 
Item Description Lead Time (Mths) Quantity Amount ( Rands ) % 
88kV insulators 4 1715 R 2,572,500 28.4% 








Total Long Lead Time Material Approved MMmmm R 2,986,500 32.9% 
NEW MATERIAL COSTS (CUSTOMER PROJECT) 
RE-USED MATERIAL COST (DEPRECIATED) 
PROJECT PHYSICAL STATISTICS 
Build / Install t Refurbish KrrfsHV Km'sMV Km'sLV Comments 
Line 64.00 Refurb 
Cable 
Dismantle / Recover Km's HV KnVsMV Km'sLV Comments 
Line 
Cable 
Bulk*/Install/Refurbish Quantity : | lT^ifi^vi:S Comments 
Transformers 
Dismantle t Recover Quantity !:!;%tJ:ivlf§: 
Transformers 
Customer Cormdcttorts Quantity Total Cost Coftt / Conn. Comments 
Electrification Connections R #DIV/0! 
Minor Works Customer Connections R #DIV/0! 
BUSINESS PLAN KPTS KPt THIS PROJECT TARGET KPI 'MMMmMS^ COMMENTS 
Cost per Transformer #DIV/0! R/Unit 
Cost per MVA (Subtransmission only) #DIV/0! R/MVA 
Cost per Kilometer (Subtransmission only) R 141,673 R /Km 
MVA per Transformer #DIV/0! MVA / Unit 
MVA per Kilometer (Retic & Elect) #DIV/0! MVA/Km 
Transformers per Kilometer (Retic & Elec) #DIV/0! No /Km 
Connections per Kilometer (Retic.& Elec) #DIV70! No/Km 
DISMANTLING INFORMATION 
Asset Dismantled Description Asset number / Year Cost Ace Depreciation Book Value 
FORM 150 REV1 PROJECT CAPITAL RELEASE Standard 
PROJECT DETAILS 
Asset Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Parent Project Name 
Project ID N010236 Form Registration Date 15-May-2002 
Project Initiator Name Manogaran Chetty Form Registered By Manogaran Chetty 
Engineering Region Eastern Initiator Tel No +27 31 7105057 
Technical Service Area Cato Ridge Distribution Customer Load Network 
Customer Service Area Pietermarltzburg Network Development Plan / F1 Area Hammars/ Elangeni 
Field Service Area Pietermaritzburg Project Latitude Coordinate 
Magisterial District Project Longitude Coordinate 
BUSINESS CATEGORY t PROGRAMMES 
Refurbishment 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION & MOTIVATION 
Executive Summary / Motivation 
Gerogedale Northdene 88kV Line 2 was investigated as part of the Hammersdale NDP. The physical condition, and performance of the 
Georgedale Lines has triggered the refurbishment scope below. 
Scope of Work Description 
Paint 225 towers on line 2 including tees. Relabel 225 towers. Restring 69km of earthwire. Replace 1715 insulators and all associated 
hardware. Clear the servitude of trees and shrubs. 
Relevant Reference Documents 
Refer to Planning Department's Hammersdale NDP Report. 
Available in Teammate. 
Project Family Details 
Interdependent Asset Names Project ID Form 10 Value 
Georgedale Northdene 88kV line 1 refubishment N010234 R 9,032,998 
Total Parent Project Value R 1,110,041 
PROJECT ECONOMIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Economic Class. Strategic 
Optimistic MIRR (%) Pessimistic MIRR ( %) 
Optimistic NPV ( R ) Pessimistic NPV ( R ) 
Optimistic ERR (%) Pessimistic ERR (% ) 
PROJECT DATES 
Project Required Completion Date 31-Jul-2005 Budget Year 2004 
TOTAL COST ESTIMATES PER REPORTING CATEGORY 
JOB CATEGORY Sub-Transmission Lines (66-132 kV) Year (Rands) 
TOTAL PROJECT CAPITAL COST R 9,170,504 100% 
TOTAL DISMANTLE COST R 
CONTRIBUTION FUNDING R 7,716,572 84% 
TOTAL PROJECT COST CONTRACTED (VALUE A ) R 9,170,504 100% 
TOTAL ASSET VALUE (VALUE B) R 1,453,932 16% 
TOTAL CASH FLOW REQUIRED (VALUE C) 
|cUSTOMER QUOTATION VALUE (VALUE D) 
*:*:^?rr«^^-:*:.:^^:.':^^^>*x-:-:.:-::::-:-:::x:-:- M :: :«i:VYr: ::l :yw ::::*"^>?.^; :* ;Xx: :: 
Project Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Project ID N010236 WBS ROOT WKL2G2/WKL2G3 
PROJECT COSTS (CAPITAL ONLY) 
Job Category Amount ( Rands ) % 
Total Engineering costs from F15 R 408,153 4.5% 
Additional Engineering Costs R 
Total Direct Engineering Costs R 408,153 4.5% 
Materials (new , re-used & transport) R 5,656,030 61.7% 
Contracts R 218,000 2.4% 
Internal Construction R 2,228,134 18.5% 
Other Internal Labour R 35,000 0.4% 
Less: Dismantle Costs (if Total Dismantle Job) R 
Sub-Total Direct Costs R 8,545,317 93.2% 
Overheads R 495,184 5.4% 
IDC R 130,003 1.4% 
Total Capital Projects Costs R 9,170,504 100% 
F15 (or latest approved form 150) Costs R 12,040,295 n/a 
Variance R 2,869,791 23.83% 
Cost Variance Explanation 
Original F150 costs for internal construction and other internal labour were inadvertently doubled and thus this reduction is as a result 
of that mistake being rectified. 
DISMANTLE < R20.000 No 
DISMANTLE COSTS CONTRIBUTION FUNDING R 7,716,572 
CURRENT OVERHEAD % 6.0% CURRENT IDC % 1.8% 
PROJECT SCHEDULE 
( a ) Estimated Project Completion Date 18-Sep-2005 IcONSTRUCTION START DATE 01-Sep-2004 
( b ) Project Committed Completion Date (Base line in Scheduling System) 30-Jun-2004 
Schedule Variance Explanation 
Group approval processes in terms of customer contributions delayed the projecLNegotiations with the customer in terms of the 
contribution, took longer than anticipated Quantifying of the scope of work. 
Environmental Status No Environmental Impact 
••.'.•.'.•.•.v.-.-.-.-v.'.-.-.''.v.•.-.-.-.-.-.v.v. .v.--v v--.v.-/. -.-.•.'.'.'..'.;,•.-.-.-.'.,. - /.-.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.v.' ,.,-.•. .v. -...-.-.--.'.-.-.-.v.v . v . , - . ' - '.'.-.-...'-.-.-.-. .v-.'.v —v. - . . ' - •• 
PROJECT ACCEPTANCE (Relevant to Project) 
Role Name Contact Tel. No 
Project Manager A Ball 8311-3685 AVB 14-Oct-2004 
Project Services Officer A Filtane 8311 3441 A Filtane 14-Oct-2004 
Project Controller E Deere 83113741 E Deere 14-Oct-2004 
CtC APPROVAL FOR EXPENDITURE wmr$W$w 100% 
CIC Meeting Date 18-Oct-2004 CIC Meeting No. 300 
CPM / CIC Comments 
Capital Programme Manager / CIC Signatory D Conradie 18-Oct-04 
PROJECT DETAILS FORM 150 PAGE 3 
Project Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Project ID N010236 
NEW MATERIAL COSTS (CUSTOMER PROJECTS) 
RE-USED MATERIAL COSTS (DEPRECIATED ) 
PROJECT PHYSICAL STATISTICS 
Build / Install / Refurbish Km's HV Km'sMV Km'sLV Comments 
Line 64.00 
Cable 
Dismantle / Recover Km's HV Km's MV Km'sLV Comments 
Line 
Cable 
Build / fnstall / Refurbish Quantity nents Total rvfvA 
Transformers 
Dismantle / Recover Quantity Total MVA 
Transformers 
Customer Connections Quantity Total Cost Cost/Conn. Comments 
Electrification Connections #DIV/0! R 
Minor Works Customer Connections R #DIV/0! 
BUSINESS PtAN KPI'S KPI THIS PROJECT TARGET KPI UNITS COMMENTS 
Cost per Transformer #DIV/0! R/Unit 
Cost per MVA (Subtransmission only) #DIW0! R/MVA 
Cost per Kilometer (Subtransmission only) R 143,289 R /Km 
MVA per Transformer #DIV/0! MVA / Unit 
MVA per Kilometer (Retic & Elec) #DIV/0! MVA/Km 
Transformers per Kilometer (Retic & Elec) #DIV/0! No/Km 
Connections per Kilometer (Retic & Elec) #DIV/0! No/Km 
DISMANTLING INFORMATION ' • ' - : ^ - < ^ . : . . " " 
Asset Dismantled Description Asset number / Year Cost Ace Depreciation Book Value 
FORM 101 : COMPLETION CERTIFICATE Standard 
PROJ EC5T D6TAIl.5> 
Asset Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Parent Project Name 
Project ID N010236 Form Registration Date 15-May-2002 
Project Initiator Name Manogaran Chetty Form Registered By Manogaran Chetty 
Engineering Region Eastern Initiator Tel No +27 31 7105057 
Technical Service Area Cato Ridge Distribution Customer Load Network 
Customer Service Area Pietermaritzburg Network Development Plan / F1 Area Hammars/ Elangeni 
Field Service Area Pietermaritzburg Project Latitude Coordinate 
Magisterial District Project Longitude Coordinate 
BUSINESS CATEGORY / PROGRAMMES 
Refurbishment 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION & MOTIVATION 
Executive Summary / Motivation 
Gerogedale Northdene 88kV Line 2 was investigated as part of the Hammersdale NDP. The physical condition, and performance of 
the Georgedale Lines has triggered the refurbishment scope below. 
Scope of Work Description 
Paint 225 towers on line 2 including tees. Relabel 225 towers. Restring 69km of earthwire. Replace 1715 insulators and all 
associated hardware. Clear the servitude of trees and shrubs. 
Relevant Reference Documents 
Refer to Planning Department's Hammersdale NDP Report. 
Available in Teammate. 
Project Family Details 
Interdependent Asset Names Project ID Form 10 Value 
Georgedale Northdene 88kV line 1 refubishment N010234 R 9.032,998 
Total Parent Project Value R 1.110,041 
PROJECT ECONOMIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Economic Class. Strategic 
Optimistic MIRR ( %) Pessimistic MIRR ( % ) 
Optimistic NPV ( R ) Pessimistic NPV ( R ) 
Optimistic ERR ( % ) Pessimistic ERR (% ) 
H K O J t C I UAlfcb 
Project Required Completion Date 31-Jul-2005 Budget Year 2004 
TrtTAt ftlfiT PRTtMATP«; DPO BPPfltSTtMf» <"vATPfirtl6'V' 
JOB CATEGORY Sub-Transmission Lines (66-132 k V ) Rands (Year) 
FORM 10 F O R M 15 F O R M 150 FORM 101 
TOTAL PROJECT CAPITAL COST R 1,110,041 R 9,067,062 R 9,170,504 R 
TOTAL DISMANTLE COST R 434,763 R 248,904 R R 
CONTRIBUTION FUNDING R R 7,716,572 R 7,716,572 R 
TOTAL PROJECT COST (VALUE A ) R 1,544,804 R 9,315,966 R 9,170,504 R 
TOTAL ASSET VALUE (VALUE B) R 1,110,041 R 1,350,490 R 1,453,932 R 
TOTAL CASH FLOW REQUIRED (VALUE C) R 1,110,041 R 1,350,490 R R 
CUSTOMER QUOTATION VALUE (VALUE D) R 1,575,078 R R R 
PROJECT DETAILS FORM 101 PAGE 2 
Asset Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment 
Project ID N010236 WBS ROOT |WKL2G2/WKL2G3 
Environmental Status Mo Environmental Impact 
Used Material Costs R New Material Costs R 
Dismantle Costs (Construction) R O/H Rate Used 6% 
SUMMARY OF SCHEDULE VARIANCES BASELINE ACTUAL VARIANCE 
FORM 15 31-May-2003 21-Jul-2003 -51 
FORM 150 04-Aug-2003 18-Oct-2004 -441 
FINAL PLANT ENERGISED 1 MADE AVAILABLE DATE 
CONSTRUCTION DURATION (DAYS) 382 38200% 
SCHEDULE VARIANCE EXPLANATIONS 
SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURE 
RESOURCE APPROVED illliiiiil ::j;:lVARlANd;E-:.-.:;: %VAR 
Direct Engineering Costs R 408,153 R 408,153 100% 
Materials (new , re-used & transport) R 5,656,030 R 5,656,030 100% 
Contracts R 218,000 R 218,000 100% 
Internal Construction R 2,228,134 R 2,228,134 100% 




Sub-Total Direct Costs R 8,545,317 R R 8,545,317 100% 
Overheads R 495,184 R 495,184 100% 
IDC R 130,003 R 130,003 100% 
Less: Customer Contribution R -7,716,572 R -7,716,572 100% 
Total R 1,453,932 R R 1,453,932 100% 
PROJECT FINALISATION 
Role Name Contact Tel. No. Signature Date 
CPMICIC APPROVAL 
CIC Meeting Date CIC Meeting No. 
CPM / CIC Comments 
Capital Programme Manager / CIC Signatory 
FORM F150 REVISIONS 
Revision No. Reason For Revised F150 Variance Amount 
Asset Name Georgedale Northdene 88kV Line 1 Refurbishment |Project ID N010236 
COST VARIANCE EXPLANATION AND COMMENTS 
^i>C^T:£iiif±i&. VARIANCE % tflKtUt trJtalPiccrMitvj w o i o 
R 408,153 100% 
MATERIALS VARIANCE "i 
R 5,656,030 100% 
CONTRACTS >V£R)/ UNDE % 
R 218,000 100% 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR VARIANCE % 
R 2.228,134 100% 
Iliiiloliilllllt^ VARIANCE % 
R 35,000 100% 
OTHER IvAiAicE; % 
R N/a 
v . - - - . - , ; . ' • . - . ; . • - • . • . . . . - . . - . - . . . - • 
% ' OVERHEADS/1DC VARIANCE 
R 625,187 100% 
SCHEDULE VARIANCE VARIANCE % 
382 38200% 
i u : ntzswj ur- L U O I S I I U O U M I C . o/uo/uo 
FROM: PROJECT ENGINEERING _ REV: 13 
CEOGEDALE NORTHDENE 88kV LINE 1 REFURBISHMENT 
WBS : WKL2GN/WKL2GG 
BILL OF MATERIALS : FINAL  
NOTES: 
1. This BOM is based on FINAL line design. 
2. Materials Management shall confirm all materials ordered by marking up a copy of this BOM and 
returning same to Project Engineering 
DWG REVO REV1 REV 2 REVS REV4 REV 5 REVS REV 7 REVS REV 9 REV 10 REV 11 REV 12 REV 13 Total Unit Total 
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION SAP No. DWG No. REV UNIT Qtv Cost Cost 
HARDWARE 28/07/03 28/09/03 7/07/04 20/08/04 25/11/04 8/02/05 11/03/05 05/05/05 19/07/05 12/10/05 18/10/05 8/11/05 
WIRE STRAND 3/4mm STEEL 1100 Mpa 0185944 D-DT-7036 1 m 69000 69000 R3.50 R 241,500 
INSULATOR, LONG ROD 86-kV 120kN 31mm/W 0167515 ea 1715 1715 R 1,200.00 R 2,056,000 
INSULATOR, SUSP, C+T S/WIRE 70kN 0167605 D-DT-7012 1 ea 80 250 200 530 R 100.00 R 53,000 
BALI-EYE, OVAL 16mm 120kN 0010258 D-DT-7008 0 ea 174 1200 1374 R 13.00 R 17,862 
BALL-EYE, OVAL , LIVE LINE 16mm 120kN BUYOUT 1002 1002 R 32.50 R 32,565 
SHACKLE, STRAIGHT BOLT TYPE, 120 KN 0163406 D-DT-7017 2 ea 1844 1844 R 15.00 R 27.660 
BANDIT BUCKLE, STAINLESS STEEL 12mm 0108541 ea 4000 4000 R0.35 R 1,400 
STRAPPING, STAINLESS STEEL 12mm X 0.75mm 0108554 30m roll S 8 R 45.00 R360 
SAG ADJUSTER, 120KN 0175857 D-DT-7042 1 ea 50 50 R6000 R 3,000 
SOCKET CLEVIS 16mm IEC.120KN 0010259 D-DT-7021 0 ea 1002 -800 202 R 55.00 R 11.110 
SOCKETTONGUE.120KN 10270 ea 174 320 1380 1874 R 42.60 R 79,832 
ARMOUR GRIP SUSPENSION UNIT-WOLF 001145 D-DT-7033 0 ea 138 138 R 185.00 R 25,530 
ARMOUR GRIP SUSPENSION UNIT-MINK 0168965 D-DT-7033 1 ea 36 150 186 R 85.00 R 15,810 
JOINT, NON-TENSION ALUMINIUM, Mink C/CRIMP 166013 D-DT-3098 7 ea 100 100 R 14.30 R 1,430 
U-BOLTS FOR SUSPENSION S/C « D/C TOWERS CONSTRUCTION TO PROCURE A S REQUIRE 3 
COMPRESSION DEAD END-WOLF 0010839 D-DT-7000 2 ea 714 714 R 130.00 R 92.820 
COMPRESSION OEAD END-MINK ea 288 286 R 80.00 R 23,040 
RAZOR MESH FLAT WRAP 450mm DIAMETER BUYOUT m 16500 16500 R5.00 R 82,500 
GALVANSIED 4mm WIRE STRAND -MILD STEEL BUYOUT m 16500 16500 R0.40 R 6,600 
CLAMP, PISTOL 3 BOLT TYPE 5-16mm FOR EARTHWIRE 0185253 D-DT-7022 6 ea 668 668 R 42.00 R 28,056 
CROSBY CLAMP, 12mm 0000225 D-DT-7032 2 ea 668 668 R4.50 R 3,006 
CONDUCTOR, ACSR MINK, GREASED 0171327 D-DT-3136 7 m 4500 4500 R5.50 R 24,750 
CONCERTINA RAZOR WIRE -STAINLESS STEEL -450 D\? BUYOUT m 1000 1000 R 35.00 R 35,000 
(INDEPENDENT RAZOR AND WELD MESH SUPPLIERS-M *RK TEL 031-70C 5555) 
DAMPER, VIBRATION SPIRAL 6.29-11.71 0010899 D-DT-3175 2 ea 50 450 500 R 15.00 R 7,500 
DAMPER, VIBRATION STOCKBRIDGE 18.13-19.98 0168960 D-DT-7005 4 ea 540 R 115.00 R 62,100 
ABB CHAIN LINKS -CAT NO 977005-00 A=70 B=28 C= 16 ea 100 100 R 20.00 R 2,000 
CLAMP, SUSPENSION CRADLE, CONDUCTOR 8.0 - 18.0 0168534 D-DT-3008 10 ea 100 100 R 45.00 R 4.500 
PAINTING-CONCRETE TOWERS 
SIKA MONOTOP 612 REPAIR MORTAR BUYOUT SIKA (PTY) LTD 20 KG 24 24 R 800.00 R 19,200 
SIKAGARD 550 ELASTIC PRIMER BUYOUT SIKA (PTY) LTD 25 LITRES 24 24 R 950.00 R 22,800 
SIKAGARD 550W ELASTIC TOP GREY BUY our SIKA (PTY) LTD 20 LITRES 24 24 R 950.00 R 22,800 
GALVANISED STEEL MEMBERS FOR LATTICE TOWERS BUYOUT KG 10000 10000 R 15.00 R 150,000 
BOM 
DWG REVO REV1 REV 2 REV 3 REV 4 REV 5 R REV 7 REV 8 REV 9 REV 10 REV 11 REV 12 REV 13 Total Unit Total 
MATERIAL DESCRIPTION SAP No. DWG Ho. REV UNIT Qtv Cost Cost 
DAMPER, VIBRATION SPIRAL 8.29-11.71 0010899 D-DT-3175 2 ea 1800 1800 R 15.00 R 27,000 
DAMPER. VIBRATION STOCKBRIDGE 18.13-19.98 0168960 D-DT-7005 4 ea 500 500 R 115.50 R 57,750 
WOOD-POLE STRUCTURES FOR TEMPORARY WORKS | 
POLE, WOOD 13m X 180-199 TOP DIA. 0164577 D-DT-0056 5 20 20 20 20 R 530.00 R 10,600 
POLE, WOOD 9m x 160-179 TOP DIA. 0164561 D-DT-0055 6 10 10 10 10 R 610.00 R 6,100 
PAINTING-STEEL LATTICE TOWERS 
AMERLOCK 400AL EPOXY PRIMER 5 LITRES 876 100 976 R 800.00 R 780,800 
AMERCOAT 385 M10 EPOXY BASE COAT 5 LITRES 876 75 951 R 800.00 R 760,800 
AMERCOAT 450 EPOXY FINAL COAT 5 LITRES 876 50 926 R 800.00 R 740,800 
EPOXY THINNERS 5 LITRES 110 110 R 500.00 R 55,000 
UTILITY PAINT BRUSH, 75mm ea 125 125 R 25.00 R 3,125 
UTILITY PAINT BRUSH, 50mm ea 125 125 R 20.00 R 2,500 
WIRE BRUSH WITH HANDLE ea 50 50 R 30.00 R 1,500 
80 GRIT EMERY PAPER (400mm WIDE ROLL) m 50 50 R 20.00 R 1,000 
60 GRIT EMERY PAPER (400mm WIDE ROLL) m 50 50 R 15.00 R750 
VESTING MATERIAL KG 15 15 R 35.00 R525 
TOTAL COST 
Report by Eskom Construction on Materials Handling and Storage 
Dan Dukhanjiddie Rencken and I visited New Germany stores on 25/01/2006 to verify what materials 
might be available for us to collect. At ward 4 we found 162 22kV long rod insulators which are supposed 
to be the ones ordered by Chris i.e. the 40kN single skirt earthwire insulator. This item is therefore still 
outstanding and WILL cause a loss on this project. The correct drawing is D-DT-7012. 
As for SIGMA paint we have 270 first coat, 360 second coat and 600 third coat left at ward 3. We will need 
100 tins of first coat, 75 tins of second coat and 50 tins of third coat (plus hardener for each coat). Please 
order 60 of 251itre tins of ordinary lacquer thinners as well. When ordering the Sigma product ensure that it 
is held by the supplier and we will take it as and when we need it direct from the supplier. 
At dispatch there is a consignment of small hardware that we will collect early next week. (Socket-tongues, 
socket-clevises and AGS units for "Mink") 
At ward 3, we came across some damaged materials of which photos are attached. Also, for your interest, 
are photo's of the cracked concrete pole at Mlazi. 
Very roughly, 183 towers of 471 are completely painted and have had the hardware and earthwire changed, 
another 211 have been painted 1st and 2nd coat only and only half the tower coated. 
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